Conference
Schedule
India
Vietnam Ties: Retrospect and Prospect
India International Centre (Annexe), New Delhi, India
Tuesday, 14th February 2012.
Inaugural
and Welcome: 10:30am-11:15am
Welcome: Ms.Sayantani Sen, Fellow, GIF
Brief Remarks: Prof.Omprakash Mishra, Member Secretary,
GIF and Dr.Sreeradha Datta, Director, MAKAIAS
Special Address: Mr.Pinak R.Chakravarty, Special Secretary,
Public Diplomacy Division, GOI
Chair: Vice Admiral P.J.Jacob, Chairman, GIF
Vote of Thanks
Tea
– 11:15 am -11:30am
Session I – 11:30am- 1:00pm
Vietnam and India in the Asian Balance of Power:
Security Perspectives
Chair: Amb.Arundhati Ghose (Former Permanent Representative
to the UN and Member, Executive Council, GIF)
1.Dr. S.D Pradhan, Former Dy.National Security Advisor
2.Dr. Binoda Mishra, Fellow, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute
of Asian Studies, Kolkata
3.Mr. Rahul Mishra, Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies
& Analyses, New Delhi
4.Ms. Cauvery Ganapathy, Fellow, GIF
Lunch: 1:00pm-2:00pm
Session II - 2:00pm – 3:30pm
Economic relations between India and Vietnam: Exploring
Realities and Potential
Chair: Mr.D.C.Pathak (Former IB Chief, GOI and Member, Executive
Council, GIF)
1.Prof. Ngo Xuan Binh, Director-General, Vietnam Institute
of South and Southwest Asian Studies, Ha Noi
2.Dr. Nguyen Huy Hoang, Deputy Director, Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, Ha Noi
3.Ms. Panchali Saikia, IPCS, New Delhi
Tea
– 3:30pm-3:45pm
Session III – 3:45pm – 4:45pm
India-Vietnam Ties: Retrospect and Prospect
Chair: Mr.K.Santhanam (President, India-Central Asia Foundation)
1.Prof. Dr. Vo Van Sen, President (Vice-Chancellor) University
of Social Sciences and Humanities, Ho Chi Minh City
2.Mr.Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, Diplomatic Correspondent, Mail
Today, New Delhi
Vote
of Thanks
Dinner
Reception at IIC (Annexe) 7:30pm onwards
India
Vietnam Ties: Retrospect and Prospect
14th February 2012
Conference
Picture
(A)
From L to R: Prof. Omprakash Mishra, Prof. Vo Van Sen, Admiral
P J Jacob, Mr. Pinak R Chakravarty, Dr. Sreeradha Datta
and Prof. Suranjan Das
(B) From L to R: Admiral P J Jacob, Mr. Pinak R Chakravarty
(C) A cross-section of the participating audience
(D) From L to R: Dr. Nguyen Hui Hoang, Prof. Vo Van Sen,
Prof. Ngo Xuan Binh and Ms. Panchali Saikia
(E) From L to R: Ms. Cauvery Ganapathy, Mr. Dipanjan Roy
Choudhuri, Prof. Omprakash Mishra, Dr. S D Pradhan and Prof.
Ngo Xuan Binh
Global
India Foundation, in collaboration with Maulana Abul Kalam
Azad Institute of Asian Studies (MAKAIAS), Kolkata, Institute
of Foreign Policy Studies, University of Kolkata and Gamesa,
India organized the International Conference on India-Vietnam
Ties: Retrospect and Prospect at India International Centre
Annex, New Delhi on the 14th February 2012.
Ms.
Sayantani Sen, Academic Coordinator, Global India Foundation
introduced the International Conference in the inaugural
session. Vice Admiral P.J Jacob, Chairman, Global India
Foundation, formally initiated the proceedings. He introduced
Global India Foundation’s endeavor to host a “Conference
series” to examine India’s critical bilateral
relations with neighbouring countries, beginning with Vietnam.
He outlined the objective of the Conference to be an assessment
of the evolution of India-Vietnam ties over the decades
with special emphasis on trade and economic interactions,
security perspectives on India-Vietnam in the Asian balance
of power and emerging areas of cooperation. Dr. Sreeradha
Datta, Director, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian
Studies (MAKAIAS) assured of renewed institutional focus
on Southeast Asia and deeper collaboration with Global India
Foundation and The Foreign Policy Institute, University
of Calcutta along these lines. Prof. Dr. Vo Van Sen, President
(Vice Chancellor), University of Social Sciences and Humanities,
Ho Chi Minh City expressed his belief that the deliberations
of the Conference would help in reviewing lessons and experiences
of history to recognize possibilities for the stronger development
of relations between India and Vietnam in the 21st century.
He also mentioned the establishment of an India Studies
Centre in his esteemed University, as a part of their endeavour
to build closer understanding and ties between the two countries.
Dr. Suranjan Das, Vice Chancellor, University of Calcutta
and Director, Institute of Foreign Policy Studies, Kolkata,
expressed his solidarity with Global India Foundation in
conducting academic deliberations which focus on constructive
bilateralism, beyond the problem-centric approach of analyzing
inter-state ties. Prof. Omprakash Mishra, Member Secretary,
Global India Foundation, delivered the concluding remarks
and asserted that India and Vietnam must align in the new
world order on the basis on the balance of interest and
opportunities, and sustain the symmetry they historically
share with each other. He pointed out that the international
relations of today is not about seeking ascriptions of power
or authority but fulfilling roles with responsibility and
asserted that Global India Foundation tries to champion
the consolidation of India as a responsible global player.
Shri
Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty, Special Secretary, Public Diplomacy
Division, Government of India delivered a special address
in the inaugural session. He lauded the initiatives currently
underway in India and Vietnam but also emphasized the need
for injecting greater economic content in the relations,
articulating and speeding up modalities of cooperation and
exploring new areas of building partnerships. He identified
education, science, technology and innovation through systematic
Research and Development to be key areas where India and
Vietnam can undertake leadership to develop brand equities,
beyond the existing models of the West, recognized for their
competence globally. This in fact, would surge trade relations
ahead. He also stressed on the need for promoting deeper
understanding between the countries through higher linguistic
training. He observed that there is a distinct multipolar
fluidity in Asia, which must be carefully nurtured. The
rigidities of the past must not impede the new cobweb of
vectors from gaining their own unique balance in strategic
affairs. He expressed hope that the Conference would be
able to identify virgin areas of cooperation and collaboration
for India and Vietnam and provide policy prescription to
the Governments. This would help charter the course for
apportioning finite resources and investments by the two
countries, guided by the impulses of development of markets
and strategic cooperation.
The inaugural session was concluded by a vote of thanks
proposed by Ms. Sreya Maitra Roychoudhury, Honorary Fellow,
Global India Foundation.
Ambassador Arundhati Ghose chaired the first working session
on India and Vietnam in the Asian Balance of Power: Security
Perspectives and presided over a panel which included Dr.
S.D Pradhan (Former Deputy National Security Advisor), Dr.
Binoda Mishra (Fellow, MAKAIAS) and Ms. Cauvery Ganapathy
(Fellow, GIF). Ambassador Ghosh pointed out that as a non-Delhi
centric organization GIF provides a unique platform for
voicing opinions from the rest of India. And in this context,
she welcomed the insights and opinion of the Vietnamese
delegates. She observed that much of India and Vietnam’s
population are young, who do not carry the baggage of history
with them and are willing to look forward. The strategic
ties of India and Vietnam are conditioned by the fact that
both are growing economies; their needs as well as vulnerabilities
are increasing. The strategic objective, under the circumstances
veers towards securing resources and technologies. It important
to ask, “what drives a strategic relationship?”
She expressed the belief that it is important to bring out
policy recommendations for the academic community, so that
the matter gains a critical mass and in turn assumes the
capacity to influence government policy.
Dr. Pradhan explored the problems and prospects of India
and Vietnam’s relation in the current security environment.
Dr. Mishra assessed India’s relationship with Vietnam
in the Indo-Pacific security architecture. Ms. Ganapathy
highlighted Vietnam as a common factor in the popular perceptions
and strategic imperatives of India and China and juxtaposed
the two.
The
need for strengthening India-Vietnam ties in the current
security environment
Dr S. D. Pradhan, Former Deputy National Security Advisor;
Honorary Director, International Cooperation, GIF
India
and Vietnam established diplomatic relationship in 1972.
While it is true that cultural, historical, ideological
and economic factors as also security needs have been responsible
for developing close ties between the two countries, the
changing security environment demanded closer relations
between the two countries. In 2007, the relations were upgraded
to the “strategic partners” based on complementarity
of interests in critical areas like political-diplomatic
coordination on critical bilateral, regional and international
issues; economic cooperation for mutual benefit that includes
trade, infrastructure development, assistance in agriculture
and industrial sectors, cooperation in oil exploration and
civil nuclear programmes and S&T cooperation; and defence
cooperation that includes supply of defence equipment, assistance
in training of defence personnel, joint military exercises
and in defence R&D projects.
Vietnam is significant for India for the promotion of India’s
political, economic and security interests in South East
Asia which are the essential element of India’s “Look
East Policy”. India realizes that Vietnam is a potential
regional power in the South East Asia with its strategic
location, great political stability, substantial economic
growth (7% annual economic growth), demonstrated military
prowess, market for India’s economic investment and
its deposits of offshore oil and gas. Vietnam also holds
similar views on several global issues. Like India, Vietnam
also supports reforms in the United Nations and India’s
bid for permanent membership in the UNSC.
China factor in fact weighs heavily in the respective strategic
calculus of India and Vietnam. Both had fought wars with
China and both have border problems with that country. Both
had noted that despite the Chinese claim that what we are
witnessing is the peaceful rise of China, its activities
reflect a different picture. China had, as part of its strategic
plan, created pressure points for both India and Vietnam.
For India it developed a very close relationship with Pakistan
and for Vietnam it tried to create a proxy in Kampuchea.
However, of late the security environment for both India
and Vietnam has significantly changed and demands a much
closer relationship than what is in existence today. First,
Chinese aggressive policy towards its neighbours has made
not only India and Vietnam worried but also other ASEAN
nations without a direct stake in the islands which are
claimed by China take notice. China has recently not only
strengthened the military infrastructure along the Sino-Indian
borders particularly in the Tibet Autonomous Region but
has been aggressively crossing the Line of Actual Control.
In a recent case (July 2011), a portion of wall was destroyed
in Yangtze in Arunachal Pradesh by the Chinese troops. Similarly,
the Chinese troops also destroyed in mid-2011 several bunkers
in the Chumar division of Ladakh. China also has been refusing
to grant visas to the Indians from J&K and Arunachal
Pradesh. Besides such activities, China has positioned its
troops in the Pakitan Occupied Kashmir and in the month
of July 2011, the Chinese troops and Pakistan Army jointly
carried out a military exercise opposite India’s Rajasthan
province. Alongside the China continues to provide assistance
to Pakistan in nuclear and missile fields.
For Vietnam, China has been increasing its aggressive activities
in Paracels and Spratly groups of islands. Besides a brief
war fought in 1979 and a short naval battle in Spratly,
there had been several tension generating incidents in the
recent period. This year saw two incidents reflecting growing
aggressiveness of the Chinese. On 26th May and again on
9th June, 2011 Chinese patrol boats cut the cables on Vietnamese
exploration ships, which were conducting seismic research
about 120 nautical miles off Vietnam’s central coast.
China also objected to the visit of an Indian ship INS Airavat
to the Vietnamese port of Nha Trang and oil exploration
activities of ONGC Videsh Ltd in the Vietnamese EEZ in the
South China Sea. These actions were clearly in violation
of the 2002 Declaration of the Conduct of Parties between
China and ASEAN and these led the international security
community to assess that China’s assertive policy
in this region has transformed into an aggressive attitude
towards Vietnam. From the above, it appears that China is
in the process of implementing a well-crafted, sophisticated
and long term strategy not only to secure its positions
at land and at sea but establish its hegemony in Asia.
The second feature is the decision of the Chinese authorities
to use tactical nuclear weapons to recover its territory
without adversary’s use of nuclear weapons. In the
last few years, it has become clear that China has no intention
to follow the doctrine of “No First Use” (NFU)
of nuclear weapons at least in the neighbouring regions,
which are claimed by it. While there are remote chances
of China using tactical nuclear weapons, such a threat perception
exists among the neighbouring countries of China. It has
been noted that China has increased the number of units
of short range missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons
by seven times in the last ten years reflecting the Chinese
intentions of using tactical nuclear weapons. The Chinese
deployment pattern of nuclear weapons as well as missile
bases along the bordering regions does not augur well both
for India and Vietnam.
While the strategic relations have improved in the last
five years, current developments in the security environment
demand that they should be further upgraded. In this context,
the following steps are suggested-
1) Mechanism for strategic partnership through a group of
eminent persons from both the countries representing various
fields, to provide objective and timely guidance in view
of fast changing security environment. Such a group should
be established to advise the Joint Commission and the Strategic
Dialogue mechanism for taking necessary and timely steps.
2) Further, strengthening of coordination at various international
and ASEAN mechanisms on critical issues for the maintenance
of stability and peace and development of the region is
required. For this purpose, there should be an effective
system to share strategic intelligence to assess the emerging
threats both in regional and international context. The
significance for trade and hydrocarbons calls for close
cooperation with countries which have interest in the maintenance
of peace in the South China Sea. Vietnam needs mid-sized
warships and speed boats. India should provide necessary
assistance in this regard at concessional, rates keeping
in view the strategic interests of both the countries. India
should help Vietnam to have a strong defence production
infrastructure and enhance military training facilities
for Vietnamese troops in India for submarine operations
and air warfare. Chinese growing capabilities for attacking
computer networks, close cooperation to deal with the Chinese
cyber-attacks should be given priority by both the countries.
Enhancing capabilities of the armed forces through positioning
of sophisticated radars, sensors along the border and UAV
based surveillance systems to provide early warning and
development of anti- missile systems.
3) India should step up efforts in maritime security to
assist Vietnam in capacity building including training assistance,
refit of ships, joint exercises, coordinated patrols, supply
of hardware and product support, and modernization of ports.
In civil nuclear energy projects, the cooperation needs
to be enhanced for mutual benefits. Business groups in the
countries are yet to realize full potentials available.
Lack of information on this crucial aspect was noted by
President Sang during his visit to India in October, 2011.
For the development of the South East Asia, there is a need
to broaden the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation. In this context
constructing a transport corridor (comprising railways and
road networks) connecting India and Vietnam via Myanmar,
Thailand and Cambodia merits attention.
In essence, there is a need for security experts in both
the countries to sensitize their respective governments
on the need for closer cooperation between the two countries
on diplomatic, economic, security fields. Vietnamese experts
need to put their arguments forcefully before the Indian
side and develop leverages in India to ensure that India
pays heed to the requirements of the Vietnam. The need for
a strong lobby for Vietnam in India can hardly be under-estimated.
India too has to realize that it should clearly spell out
its strategic priorities in terms of countries in South
East Asia and East Asia, whose partnership is essential
for India’s national security interests. India too
has to shed its hesitation to provide greater assistance
to build capabilities of Vietnam. It has been rightly said
by late Sri K. Subrahmanyam, a noted security expert in
February, 2011, “The crux of non-alignment is that
this country does not get involved in some other power’s
antagonism and it does not mean that we sacrifice our national
security interest by keeping away from other powers when
our national security interest necessitates our dealing
with them.” The convergence of interests of India
and Vietnam in the present security environment demands
a very close relationship to check the Chinese aggressiveness,
which has potentials to destabilize the region, as well
as to protect our legitimate interests.
Assessing
India’s Relationship with Vietnam in the Indo-Pacific
Security Architecture
Dr. Binoda Kumar Mishra, Fellow, MAKAIAS
To
describe the Asian power structure as a “Balance of
Power” structure would be more of an obfuscation of
the reality. In Balance of Power there need to be two or
more powers overtly claiming to balance each other / one
another. It would be difficult to identify such powers in
Asia who acknowledge of indulging in the act of balancing.
This is not to say that features of Balance of Power are
completely absent in Asia. Vertical proliferation of conventional
and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), a distinct feature
of Balance of Power is the dominant characteristic of Asian
security at present. But it is not as simple as Balance
of Power. A complex of security complexes overlap in Asia
juxtaposing the major Asian powers in different orders from
time to time and region to region within Asia. Secondly,
the Asian security scenario is not independent of the global
scenario resulting in broader security complexes. In this
complex security environment, India and Vietnam seemingly
find reasons to intensify mutual security interaction. The
convergence of security interest occurs on China. China’s
position in Asia and its relationships with most of its
neighbours has remained uneasy for most part of the PRC
history. The nature of Chinese aggressive foreign policy
towards her neighbours has not declined rather can be argued
to have increased in accordance with its economic rise.
But there has been a change in the approach of other countries
(neighbouring adversaries) in dealing with China’s
aggressive posturing. Vietnam is one such country in China’s
neighbourhood. The country that gave a tough time to the
Americans and importantly humiliated the Chinese now seems
to have put its foreign policy, particularly its dealings
with the Chinese on a pragmatic course.
India’s relationship with Vietnam had remained warmer
during the Cold War and is further warming up in the post-Cold
War era. During the Cold War times, India opposed US military
intervention in Vietnam risking Indo-US relations. India
also supported Vietnam’s Cambodia adventure against
the wishes of China and the US. With this background, in
the post-Cold War period, Vietnam treats India with strategic
importance. The single point where both India and Vietnam
see a strategic convergence is the China factor. Both India
and Vietnam have disputed territories with China and both
have been subjected to Chinese aggressiveness in the past
and thus both distrust China. Thus, the convergence is clear
that both India and Vietnam do not wish China to emerge
more influential in the region. Despite this convergence
India and Vietnam did not develop their defence relations
substantially during the 1990. Only at the turn of the century
serious attempts were made by India and Vietnam to come
closed in defence matters. In 2000 both countries agreed
to an institutionalised framework for regular discussions
between Indian and Vietnamese Defence Ministers to share
strategic threat perceptions and intelligence. They further
agreed to conduct naval exercises. The strategic relationship
was furthered in 2003 where both committed to assist each
other in protecting their interests in international arena;
and agreed to take gradual steps to expand cooperation in
the security and defence fields. In 2007 both agreed to
expand their cooperation into civil nuclear cooperation
and joint working on developing Vietnam’s uranium
ore. This comes long with India’s military hardware
support to make Vietnam’s aging naval ships operational.
This year, both have identified training of military personnel
and dialogue on strategic affairs on both sides, as immediate
areas of cooperation.
These increased defence interaction between the two countries
is emitting allusions that India and Vietnam are on the
path of becoming substantial strategic partners in coming
times. The real prospects of such defence cooperation resulting
in substantial strategic partnership would depend on two
major factors, viz. the preference of ASEAN nations and
Vietnam in particular as to how do they wish to manage their
traditional security affairs among themselves and vis-à-vis
China; and how willing India is to commit herself to the
cause of ASEAN nations and particularly of Vietnam. On the
first issue, it seems that ASEAN as a unit is more inclined
to manage intra-regional conflicts in non-military way showing
signs of a security community. Regarding the China threat,
given the economic prospects of emerging China to all the
ASEAN nations, direct confrontation is almost eliminated
as an option. Multi-dimensional engagement of China, and
involving regional and extra-regional powers is clearly
the preferred way. The involvement of powers like Japan,
South Korea, China, India and the US has resulted in a super-complex
of security regimes of South Asia, Southeast Asia and Northeast
Asia. In this super complex, if the presumed objective is
to contain emerging China from becoming more assertive then
countries having the power and will to openly stand against
China are going to emerge as key players for ASEAN countries
and particularly for Vietnam. In this context India and
the US are the natural choices.
The US is forthcoming in her intention to interfere in Asia
Pacific matters as evident from the statement by Secretary
of States, Hillary Clinton strongly advocating US interests
and US rights to protect its interests in the region, referring
particularly to South China Sea, in July 2010 ARF meeting
at Hanoi. This sudden move must not be seen as a statement
without reason or purpose. It came in response to two very
important Chinese actions in the South China Sea in 2009.
In June 2009, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) advised
the Chinese Central Military Commission to build an airport
and a seaport on the Mischief Reef in the Spratly island.
Secondly, “around the same time, PLA navy conducted
a large scale naval exercise in the South China Sea to demonstrate
Chinese sovereignty over the islands.” These events
suggest that “China would never waive its right to
protect its core interests with military means.” These
events called for strong counter posture which the US displayed
to assuage the fear of ASEAN countries and particularly
of Vietnam against China.
India on the other hand, seems reluctant to commit herself
to any contentious issues in the region that involves China.
India’s power is perceived to be limited as India,
being the sole power in South Asia has not been able to
establish peace and stability in the region. Secondly, India’s
‘no stand’ on contentious issues such as Taiwan
and South China Sea is seen as lacking in will to play a
bigger role in the emerging strategic scenario in the Asia
Pacific. Two factors limit India’s ambition to play
a bigger role in the region: Engaging China; and inhibition
to get too close to the US. This century is witnessing an
increased economic engagement between India and China with
China emerging as India’s largest trading partner.
India does not intend to antagonise China on issues that
do not directly bother India. Secondly, committing a too
close defence relationship amounting to an alliance with
Vietnam would effectively draw India into the strategic
alliance headed by the US. This is an uncomfortable situation
for India considering India’s image as a big power
in her own rights. This possibility becomes all the more
probable considering the recent articulation of the term
Indo-pacific by the United States taking a cue from Australian
Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd’s articulation during
his Asia Foundation speech at San Francisco in 2009. It
is too early to experience the Indo-Pacific security architecture
but drawing India into a security structure that India does
not feel to be in her immediate interest may be reason enough
to feel being drawn into the US sphere of influence. Unless
India decides her strategic course of action for the Asia
Pacific and the recently articulated Indo-pacific region,
Vietnam will see India as of moderate utility for her strategic
interests and would rather depend on the US for protecting
her interests vis-à-vis China. The defence cooperation
between India and Vietnam promises prospects only if India
shows clear commitment to Vietnamese strategic interests
and reconciles to the fact of working with the US may bring
her in direct confrontation with China.
India
and China in Vietnam: Of Popular Perceptions and Strategic
Imperatives
Cauvery Ganapathy, Coordinator (Programme and Outreach)
Global India Foundation
International
relations can rarely afford to be a parley of zero-sum games.
The principle of exclusivity is eschewed by the very basic
diktats of structural realism and it is in this context
that the India-China-Vietnam dynamic needs to be appreciated.
The national personality and demographics of India and China
naturally posit them against each other and magnify the
variance. The prevailing economic complementarities between
the two countries will be exhausted eventually and the competition
for scarce energy resources will only exacerbate the rivalry.
A desire to impact the immediate neighbourhood also is an
inherent feature of both nations and this tendency pitches
one against the other commonly. Sino-Indian competition
therefore plays out at several points of contact. One such
issue on which India and China find themselves in a discomforting
consternation over is the growing proximity of Hanoi to
New Delhi, or the perception thereof. Just as Beijing has
strategic realties determining the level of importance it
accords to Vietnam, India too has specific compulsions to
contend with in wanting to consolidate her links with Hanoi.
The purpose of the paper is to locate the value of the India-Vietnam
dynamic without an exclusive allusion to the ‘China
Factor’ and to suggest that while strategic competition
between India and China is a given in most contexts, India’s
ties with Vietnam needs to stand on its own strength and
not be a harbinger or determinant of that particular competition.
The paper also attempts to make a case for Sino-Indian cooperation
in multifaceted areas of mutual concern, mitigating the
obvious points of difference.
The South China Sea has been declared by Beijing to be an
issue of Core National Interest. In addition to its substantial
size and resources, Vietnam bears a natural strategic relevance
to the Indo-China Peninsula as whole, and Beijing in particular,
with its coastline along China’s disputed and undisputed
territorial waters. Additionally, Vietnam has a rich legacy
of resistance against larger powers and it is realistic
for Beijing to be concerned about a spillover effect emanating
from Vietnam’s broader positioning vis-à-vis
China. China’s interests in Vietnam therefore are
singularly significant and would have a bearing on any other
partnerships in the region.
Juxtaposed with Chinese interest in Vietnam, is India’s
relation with Hanoi. Much before India articulated her formal
‘Look East Policy’, Vietnam featured on her
strategic radar. There is a rich legacy of camaraderie in
international affairs between the two countries. Post the
decolonization era, New Delhi proved a worthy partner in
several instances such as aiding the cause of reconstruction
after the Vietnam War and the support during the Kampuchean
crisis even at the cost of alienating the ASEAN members.
The legacy of defense cooperation between the two countries
stems from the coinciding legacy of a Soviet arms supply
tandem. However, India’s Vietnam dynamic has been
the story of a series of confabulations in policy changes.
While the two found themselves negotiating a similar mien
of the international environment in their struggle against
colonization, in time, the differing and very contextual
trajectories of growth and impulses saw India and Vietnam
drift apart. The customary proclamations were interspersed
with periodic visits of governmental and non-governmental
delegations, odes were sung to an old and valued partnership,
but not much was forthcoming by way of tangible and significant
strategic or economic benefits. While the intent to harness
the full potential of an important relationship is the moot
cause of the efforts to re-invigorate this old partnership,
it is also a fact that the Chinese presence in the region
qualifies as a compelling factor. The recent spurt in interaction
and attempts at reconfiguring the old ties is necessarily
determined by the India’s energy security concerns
and the fact that a substantive portion of India’s
trade passes through the South China Sea. In addition to
this, the South China Sea also qualifies as a natural firmament
in India’s ambitions of creating a Blue Water Navy.
China and India are locked in a classic security dilemma
scenario where any action taken by one side is immediately
viewed as being in direct opposition to the welfare of the
other’s interest. In several matters of national interest
and regional configurations, this competition becomes unavoidable.
The border issues between the two countries, the port build-ups
in Chittagong and the Hambantota ports, the activity in
Myanmar’s Coco Islands and the Indian Ocean, qualify
as issues on which Sino-Indian competition is direct and
critical. The paper uses a comparative scenario building
model to show why the dictum of zero-sum rivalry may not
hold true in the case of Sino-Indian interactions with and
over Vietnam. The calculus of a zero sum affair may also
be proved redundant by establishing that in the case of
the South China Sea issue, the entry of a non-claimant will
only complicate an already complicated issue. India needs
also to appreciate that the maintenance of peace and avoidance
of conflict in a point of transit as crucial as the South
China Sea is a non-negotiable compulsion. Furthermore, it
is in Vietnam’s geo-strategic and geo-economic interests
to actively engage with both China and India on a case by
case basis and positioning one against the other may not
prove prudent, if that were at all the intent.
The paper is based in the backdrop of the recent trend in
the Indian media that traces any change or development in
India’s regional environment to Chinese actions or
reactions. The execution of Operation Milap, an exercise
in Naval Diplomacy and the ONGC Videsh’s successful
procurement of exploration rights in the South China Sea,
triggered a series of comments and reactions in the Indian
and Chinese media. Vietnam’s proximity to India was
being questioned by the Chinese media and analytic suggestions
ranged from India’s attempts at trying to cultivate
Beijing’s sphere of influence to New Delhi acting
out its own reaction to the purported encirclement by China’s
‘String of Pearls’. While it is natural to connect
dots in a fragile strategic environment, it is also necessary
to guard against a largess of public opinion being articulated
on delicate matters of crucial national security and concerns.
Antagonizing a neighbor is not always the result of a direct
strategic or tangible use of force or threat; oftentimes,
it also results from an irresponsible outlay of public articulations
that create a threat perception. The verbal duels that the
Indian and Chinese media have been engaging in since the
allocation of the exploration rights to the OVL, is a classic
example of inadequate prudence in the management of popular
perceptions within and between the two Asian giants.
Furthermore, the paper makes a case for generic benefits
that may accrue from Sino-Indian cooperation on issues such
as Asian multilateralism, global trade negotiations/reforms,
reforms within the United Nations and restructuring of the
international financial institutions in view of the global
economy’s decentralizing point of focus.
While enumerating the tremendous benefits that can accrue
from a cooperative approach in the Sino-Indian dynamic,
the paper concludes with the observation that although Vietnam’s
relevance in the Asian security matrix is crucial, yet the
South China Sea should not serve as the stage for a Sino-Indian
rivalry to play out. There are more urgently vexing bilateral
issues that India needs to contend with when faced with
Chinese competition. However, just as India’s Vietnam
story should not form the critical theme of her dealings
with China, neither should Vietnam’s significance
in India’s strategic calculus as a traditional ally
be undermined in a bid to cultivate an understanding with
Beijing.
......
Ambassador
Ghosh observed at the end of the session that the definition
of strategic relations, compromising of economic, political-diplomatic,
military and defence provided by Dr. S.D Pradhan can be
useful for steering forward India-Vietnam ties. He viewed
India, the United States and China as the determinants of
power-play in India Vietnam relations. Ambassador Ghosh
added that maritime security and terrorism would also be
important concerns for the two countries. Also, since there
is now a high degree of multipolarity in the Asian region,
ASEAN would also play a significant role in shaping the
ties. The focal point of ties would remain economic as both
of them are growing economies and this is closely linked
to their strategic interests. Recommendations must be built
for more commonalities of interest between India and Vietnam.
Building language institutions to facilitate the understanding
of the Vietnamese perspective would be important. Dr. Hoang
asked whether India’s role would be more proactive
in the Asia-Pacific region in the future, to which Dr. Pradhan
responded by stating that India would support endeavours
by countries like Vietnam, but has its limitations and difference
in priority compared to China and the US. Regarding India’s
position on finding an international solution to the South
China Sea problem asked by Dr. Hoang, Ambassador Ghosh replied
that India would solicit the Vietnamese stand on the matter
as the Indian government has expressed interest in resolving
the dispute as per international laws. Dr. Ishani Naskar
suggested that the two countries should collaborate to develop
models of economic growth without harming the ecology. The
panel agreed that field trips to Vietnam in order to understand
commonalities of interest to increase cooperation on issues
such as disaster management. Recommendations for further
areas of research were suggested.
Before
the beginning of the second session, an MOU was signed between
the MAKAIAS (Dr. Sreeradha Datta) and Institute
of Southwest
Asian Studies (Prof. Binh) for further research.
Prof.
Ngo Xuan Binh chaired the second working session on Economic relations between India and Vietnam:
Exploring Realities and Potential. At the beginning
of the session, the Chair, Prof. Ngo Xuan Binh stated that
the Mekong Ganga Cooperation is one definite way to promote
India-Vietnam relations. Prof. Dr. Vo Van Sen delineated
forty years of multi-faceted relationship between India
and Vietnam and suggested avenues for the development of
richer ties. Dr. Nguyen Huy Hoang elaborated on the economic
relations between the two countries and explored new opportunities
to flourish and tighten bilateral cooperation in the near
future. Ms. Panchali Saikia pointed out that India and Vietnam
should utilize the potential of the Mekong-Ganga cooperation
to boost their trade.
Forty
years of Vietnam-India multi-faceted Relationship: To the
development of richer ties
Prof. Dr. Vo Van Sen, President, University of Social Sciences
and Humanities
Vietnam National University, Ho Chi Minh City
Vietnam
and India hold a traditional friendly long-standing relationship
which thrives in every page of history. These relations
are said to have been formulated about 2,000 years ago with
the arrival of Buddhism brought in by the Chinese people,
and of Hinduism by the Indian people [Greeresh Sharma, 2006].
At that time, Indians from the South also came to Vietnam
for commercial purpose. These events are still engraved
in Vietnamese stories, folk tales and historical records.
In addition, Cham people in My Son, the central of Vietnam
claim to be descendants of Indian ancestors. They migrated
to the central of Vietnam to settle down and built government
mechanism for their kingdom of Champa from the 2nd to 15th
centuries. As early as the 1st century BC, Vietnam and India
began their commercial activities. A lot of Indian merchants
came to Vietnam to settle down and foster trade between
the two nations.
India’s
influence today can still be clearly seen in literature,
religion, philosophy, art and architecture in Vietnam, in
which Cham Tower is one of the most typical examples. From
111 BC to 938 AD, over 10 centuries, Vietnam was dominated
by US Chinese feudalism. This period saw the process of
strong Sinicization and De-Sinicization in the history of
Vietnam. To successfully escape from the assimilation plot
of Han Hegemonism, the Vietnamese people cleverly based
themselves on two factors: preservation and strengthening
of their Van Lang – Au Lac cultural identities; simultaneously,
reception of the good in Indian culture.
Indianization
process took place in peace as normal cultural exchange.
Representing the profound penetration of Indian culture
was the deep taking-on of Buddhism (including by way of
communication through China and direct from India to Northern
Vietnam, taking India as firm foundation for the realization
of “Tam giao dong quy” - the combination of
the three religions Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism in
Vietnamese culture. The process of Indianization De-Indianization
in Vietnam can be said to be one of the decisive bases for
Vietnam to fully get rid of Chinese assimilation!
The appearance
of Western Colonialism in Asia interrupted the eco-cultural
exchanges between Vietnam and India. The national liberation
movement against colonial power in India and Vietnam promoted
the development of bilateral relations. Such leaders as
Mahatma Gandhi (Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi), Jawaharlal
Nehru and Ho Chi Minh actively built a solid foundation
for today’s development in both breadth and depth.
In the
two wars against France, America, the Vietnamese people
always get whole-hearted support from India. India always
views Vietnam’s struggle as for national independence
against the imperialist aggressive forces, and as typical
image for national liberation movements in Asia and the
world. Shortly after the Vietnam war, India always stood
for Vietnam, strongly condemning invasion of Vietnamese
borders from expansionist power; supporting Vietnam army
troupes into Cambodia, declaring the recognition of Vietnam’s
sovereignty over Paracel islands and Spratly islands, backing
Vietnam’s ASEAN membership, etc. For Vietnam, we consistently
support India’s stance.
The period
from early 1990s up to now, after the socialist regime in
the Soviet Union collapsed, the Cold War ended, and the
new world order is forming, India has implemented the Look-East
Policy (from New Zealand to Southeast Asia up to Northern
Asia). From geostrategic perspective, Vietnam in Southeast
Asia plays the role of an extremely critical “chain
link” in this Policy. Vietnam is ready to act as a
solid bridge for India to firmly step into Southeast Asia,
which is beneficial to both countries.
The full
diplomatic relations between Vietnam and India, established
on January 7th, 1972, have covered many major strategic
areas, basing on a mutual trust and confidence. India is
committed to promote mutually beneficial cooperation in
varied areas from military training, military medicine to
English training, from cultural activities to senior officer
exchanges, etc. Now moving forward from ideological linkages,
both countries are endeavoring to refurbish their relations
according to the requirements of economic globalization.
India and Vietnam are members of the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation.
The scope can be expanded industrial and commercial and
economic cooperation. The importance of Vietnam in Southeast
Asia dramatically increases in terms of strategy as well
as economy. Vietnam seems well poised to emerge as the new
economic hub of Asia-Pacific region to attract investors
from other nations. Therefore, India needs to exploit traditional
relationship with Vietnam to further increase trade not
only between Vietnam and India. To this end, Vietnam backs
the important relationship and role between India and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its negotiation
of an Indo-ASEAN free trade agreement. Vietnam also supports
India in its peaceful use of nuclear energy, and backs India’s
bid for a permanent candidature in an expanded United Nations
Security Council. In return, Vietnam received India’s
support for entry into the World Trade Organization. Vietnam
and India have always enjoyed good political relations and
exchanged lots of high-level visits. Most recently, in the
meeting between Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung
and Sir E. Ahamed, Indian Minister of State for the Indian
Ministry of External Affairs and Human Resources Development
during his visit to Vietnam on January 6, 2012, Sir E. Ahamed
confirmed that
“India
stands committed to forging closer relations with Vietnam
both bilaterally and within the framework of ASEAN as part
of the ‘Look East Policy’ of Indian Government.
Indeed, Vietnam is a critical pillar of this strategy. Vietnam’s
membership of ASEAN has added a new and important dimension
to the two sides’ relationship. The two countries
enjoy a strategic understanding at regional and multilateral
forums, including ASEAN, East Asia Summit, ASEM, ARF and
international organisations like WTO and UN. As two developing
countries with a young dynamic population’s stake
in the future, Vietnam and India should take advantage of
the bilateral synergies to jointly face emerging challenges
and also to exploit new opportunities.”
So far,
the two countries have signed various important bilateral
treaties and agreements such as Trade Agreement, Bilateral
Investment Promotion and Protection, Avoidance of Double
Taxation Agreement, Consular Agreement, Culture Agreement,
Tourism, Air Service, Agreement on Cooperation in Science
& Technology. In addition, two sides have also concluded
many other MOUs in specialized sectors. In a globalised
and integrated world, these bilateral relations guide the
way toward economic growth and prosperity for both countries,
and are therefore elevated to the level of a strategic partnership
through closer engagement and stronger commitment.
The
followings are some of the typical successful cooperative
activities between the two nations.
The two
countries established the India-Vietnam Joint Commission
for Economic, Scientific & Technical Cooperation on
18th December, 1982. This is a very important mechanism
for the two sides to review and promote cooperation in all
fields, including the formulation of an Action Plan for
every 3 years. So far 13 meetings of the Joint Commission
have taken place, alternatively in Hanoi and New Delhi.
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem
paid an official visit to India from February 26-28, 2007
and co-chaired the 13th meeting of the Joint Commission.
In the economic linkages, bbilateral trade has increased
rapidly since the liberalization of the economies of both
Vietnam and India. India is the 13th-largest exporter to
Vietnam, with exports have grown steadily from USD 11.5
million in 1985-86 to USD 395.68 million by 2003. Vietnam's
exports to India rose to USD 180 million, including agricultural
products, handicrafts, textiles, electronics and other goods.
The list of major Indian export basket to Vietnam includes
animal feed, pharmaceuticals, medicinal materials, plastic,
iron and steel, seafood chemicals, chemical products, machinery
and equipment, leather and leather garments, motorcycle
parts, fertilizers, and automobile parts. Between 2001 and
2006, the volume of bilateral trade expanded at 20-30% per
annum to reach USD 1 billion by 2006. Continuing the rapid
pace of growth, bilateral trade is expected to rise to USD
2 billion by 2008, 2 years ahead of the official target.
In 2010, bilateral trade exceeded US$2.7 billion, reaching
US$2.38 billion for the period of January-August 2011, an
increase of 43 percent over the corresponding period in
2010. The two countries have set a bilateral trade target
of US$7 billion by 2015. With concerted efforts by all sides,
the two nations will surely surpass this target. In the
recent 10 years, two-way trade turnover has increased by
14 times. India has been a very important economic partner
of Vietnam as it is among the countries having the biggest
direct investment in Vietnam. Actually, Vietnam offers myriad
opportunities for investments in various sectors. Indian
companies have invested in oil and gas, steel, spices, pharmaceuticals,
edible oil, steel furniture, sugar, plastics, coffee, consumer
products and other sectors. In his paper “India-Vietnam
Strategic Partnership: The Convergence of Interests”,
Dr. Subhash Kapila clearly stated that
“India
and Vietnam are both geostrategically important countries,
vital to all major nations […..] Vietnam is strongly
placed to help India in the energy sector both in terms
of oil supplies and further joint prospecting for oil and
gas. India has adequate experience in oil and gas prospecting,
especially in offshore deposits.”
There
are about 35 representative offices of Indian pharmaceutical
companies here, and about 50 other representative offices
in many areas in Vietnam in various sectors, including agriculture,
rubber, coffee, cashew nut, carbon black and tea. Particularly,
India is undertaking a US$5 billion steel plant project
by Tata Steel in the northern province of Ha Tinh.
As far
as defense is concerned, the cooperation is one of the key
points of the strategic partnership and has significantly
developed in a multilateral manner. In the security arena,
India and Vietnam cooperate under the mechanism of the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF). Being maritime nations, there is enormous
potential for maritime security cooperation between the
two countries such as in ensuring sea lanes security, prevention
of sea piracy, and so on.
In the
sectors of science, technology and space science, the Government
of India is working towards the gifting of a supercomputer
to Vietnam, and also collaboration of national space programmes.
In terms of education and training, India has also established
an English language training centre VICELT, in Da Nang and
an Entrepreneurship Development Centre in Hanoi and plans
to establish a vocational training centre in Ho Chi Minh
City. On the cultural front, India has recently taken a
decision to open an Indian Cultural Centre in Hanoi to bring
the Indian cultural traditions closer to local. Besides,
the Archeological Survey of India has decided to carry out
a restoration of the Cham monuments at My Son.
Vietnam-India
relations can justify that in a complicated changing world,
two countries can for sure build an all-round thriving strategic
relationship. An all-sided relationship based on a long-standing
traditional interrelation stemming from both countries’
strategic concern for mutual interest is of special importance
for co-existence, peaceful development in the world and
in each region! As Vietnam-India relations result from historical
current of times and course of events, there is no power
with potential to reverse their development.
Vietnam-India
relations are of strategic value. Therefore, both Vietnam
and India must always be aware of elevating these relations
to be on a par with strategic relationship. This is a great
challenge posed to be solved once both countries implement
multilateral foreign policy, diversify cooperative relationship,
and establish strategic relations with other countries.
This can reduce the interest and investment resources for
Vietnam-India relations when Vietnam and India are developing
countries, badly in need of capitals and markets. In certain
conditions, both countries can compete in attracting investment
and expanding markets.
Currently,
Vietnam and India need to develop trade and economic exchange
to keep pace with their good relationship. In recent year,
trade and economic relations have experienced dramatic growth,
but still is not commensurate with the potential. In this
relationship, Vietnam basically stands at the high trade
deficit. Moreover, India’s investment into Vietnam
and Vietnam’s investment into India haven’t
walked abreast with the good diplomatic political relationship.
The potential are beyond imagination; how to exploit this
potential is an imperative matter.
Experiences
have shown that frequent visits of high-level delegation,
dissemination of information about each other to improve
mutual understanding of the countries are critical requirements.
Currently, the knowledge of Vietnamese people on the potential
development of Indian economy, culture, literature, education
is still humble. Vice versa, India’s knowledge on
Vietnamese aspects is limited to some extent.
In the
new historical setting, deriving from strategic interests
of both countries, Vietnam-India relations will surely undergo
all-round and powerful development in the 21st century to
become Nam-Nam model – a typical strategic partnership.
Vietnam
- Indian Economic Relations and Opportunities for Future
Expansion
(Abstract)
Nguyen Huy Hoang, Deputy Director, Institute for Southeast
Asian Studies of Vietnam
Despite
sharing the close bilateral relation since their independence,
the trade and investment interactions between Vietnam and
India has not been much significant as the countries have
achieved in the political relation till the mid 1990s. This
slow pace of development in economic relations was due to
the differences in domestic institution, growth paradigm,
foreign policy preference in both countries, and regional
and global circumstances.
With the processes of the economic reforms in both the countries
in association with the India’s Look East Policy,
the bilateral economic relation between the two has been
fostered since the late 1990s. Two-way trade has been boosted
up significantly with above 20% increase per annum in average
and investment has also taken its momentum during this period.
The achievements in the bilateral economic relation heralds
the new stage of the cooperation in the context of India
and East Asian Integration and the connectivities set up
in Asia, especially after India and ASEAN signed the Free
Trade Agreement (FTA) in August 2009 in Bangkok, which came
into effect in January 2010 that could open up new dimensions
and aspects for the bilateral economic relation between
the two countries. This paper aims to elaborate the two
countries’ economic relations and explore the new
opportunities for Vietnam-India economic cooperation that
could tighten and flourish the bilateral relations between
the two countries in the near future.
The
Mekong-Ganga Cooperation: Economic Integration between India
and Vietnam
(Abstract)
Panchali Saikia, Research Officer, Institute of Peace &
Conflict Studies
India
and Vietnam are both among the fastest growing economy in
Asia. The government of both the countries has made conscious
efforts to expand the areas of economic cooperation and
increase the volume of trade and investments. Under the
thrust of the regional arrangements such as ASEAN-India
FTA, BIMSTEC and Mekong-Ganga Cooperation the bilateral
economic engagements and cooperation is poised to grow fast.
Vietnam being a core member of ASEAN and its signing of
the ASEAN-India FTA will broaden the framework for the economic
growth of both the countries. In the last few years the
bilateral trade between the two countries has reached from
USD 2.75 billion in 2010 to USD 3.9 billion. However, the
mutual trade is far below its potentials and if compared
to other countries when compared with their trade with other
countries such as China and USA. Despite enforcing trade
frameworks, there has been less than potential expansion
in economic integration between these economies. Now, both
the countries have targeted to double the trade to USD 7
billion by 2015.To give a boost to economic ties and to
receive that target both India and Vietnam must explore
all the possible avenues. There are enormous opportunities
which remain unexplored and can be encouraged and coordinated
through the regional mechanisms such as Mekong-Ganga Cooperation
and BIMSTEC. On one hand where in Southeast Asia, through
ASEAN and Greater Mekong Sub-region economic cooperation
the region has seen a steady economic growth, on the other
hand India has not explored the potentials restored under
the sub-regional cooperation. The actual trade turnover
may probably be more if Indian foreign policy renders the
scope restored in this initiative. This economic imperative
will provide further avenues for mutual cooperation. There
is a need for more cooperation between both countries in
the area of trade and tourism and also establishing people
to people contact. This is possible through overcoming the
infrastructure deficit such as establishing air connectivity,
highways and railway networks. Furthermore it is important
to emphasize on frequent meetings, monitoring and implementing
the projects within a time frame. The paper highlights these
issues in three sub-sections, ‘Unexplored Opportunities’,
‘Trade and Tourism’, ‘Infrastructure and
Economic corridors’.
......
During
the brief session of questions and comments it was pointed
out by a guest in the audience that coordination and monitoring
is required at the institutional level for the implementation
of policies. Decision-makers and representation from industries
must be involved in deliberations. Prof. Binh pointed out
that a major hurdle is the lack of information between India-Vietnam.
It is important to recognize that economic cooperation requires
a specialized discussion. Dr. Hoang pointed out that it
is not easy to have discussions on these lines because China
is there in two provinces of Greater-Mekong sub-region.
Prof. Dr. Vo Van Sen stated that there is increasing efficiency
of investment in Ganga-Mekong cooperation with China, and
such should be the case with India-Vietnam. Ms. Panchali
Saikia argued that economic zones along the borders must
be emphasised along with border ports. Sunil Chacko, in
the capacity of being a part of the World Bank, stated that
there is no natural constituency building for India-Vietnam
relations. An ethnic grouping may need to be built. It was
also asked how the Vietnamese delegates would want to invigorate
the MGC. Dr. Hoang responded that there was consensus among
Vietnamese observers that India’s political, diplomatic
and economic cooperation is solicited. To that effect, interest
groups can be built. Ms. Panchali suggested more summits
and more meetings in India at the Ministerial level, to
build a strict action plan.
The final session on India-Vietnam ties: Retrospect and
Prospect was chaired by Dr. S.D Pradhan. Dr. Ngo Xuan Binh
spoke on India-Vietnam traditional and strategic relationship
in the light of the challenges and opportunities offered
by the new global context. Mr. Dipanjan Ray Chaudhury presented
fresh perspectives on strengthening connectivity and information
dissemination between Vietnam and India to improve ties
in the future.
Promoting
Vietnam – India strategic partnership: In the new
world context
Dr. Ngo Xuan Binh, General-Director, Institute of Indian
& Southwest Asian Studies, Hanoi, Vietnam
Vietnam
and India share a long-standing traditional and friendly
relation. A new chapter of Vietnam – India relation
was opened with the official visit to India of Vietnam Prime
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in July, 2007 when leaders of the
two countries decided to elevate bilateral relation to strategic
partnership. This strategic relationship was re-affirmed
during the visit of Vietnam President Truong Tan Sang to
India in October, 2011 recently.
In the changing international context, starting from the
end of the Cold War at the beginning of 1990s, the disintegration
of Soviet Union and the vigorous trends of commercial liberalization
and globalization of economy, Vietnam – India relations
have undergone remarkable progress. Various advantageous
factors such as India’s Look East Policy, Vietnam’s
policies of renovation and global integration, the increasing
East Asian links, the political concerns of the leaders
of the two countries, help Vietnam and India in implementing
its strategic partnership. Beside opportunities, the new
global context also poses various challenges to Vietnam
– India relation. The paper also emphasizes the necessity
to develop various research programs, to strengthen the
interaction among business enterprises of the two countries,
people to people contact, academic exchanges…to provide
information and promote mutual understanding.
Vietnam – India relation: from traditional
friendship to strategic partnership: Recent researches
have shown that from the centuries before Christian Era,
Vietnam and India have had cultural and religious exchanges.
This is vividly evidenced at various cultural sites of Oc
Eo and Champa in the South and Central Vietnam. Apart from
this, in the North of Vietnam, the most important outcome
of this cultural exchange is that Budhism, originating in
India, was imported to Vietnam and later became the official
religion of this country.
Before 1990s, Vietnam – India relation was mostly
focused on political relations. After 1990s, bilateral relation
was expanded to include other spheres such as politics,
economy, culture, education, technology and security and
defence. Important factors for the promotion of Vietnam
– India relation during this period are Innovation
Policy (Ð?i M?i) of Vietnam from 1986, India’s
economic reforms in 1991 and especially India’s Look
East Policy also in 1991.
Regarding political relation, in the post Cold
War era, the governments of the two countries have made
efforts at maintaining good political relation and determined
to uplift Vietnam – India political relation to higher
levels, in order to promote effectively the cause of economic
development and international integration of both countries.
This is reflected in various state visits of leaders of
the two countries. In 2000, in order to create a framework
for the relation between the two countries in the 21st century,
with Vientiane Declaration, India and Vietnam entered Mekong
– Ganga cooperation, combining bilateral cooperation
with regional cooperation in order to bring about greater
benefits for both countries.
Coming to the 21st century, Vietnam – India political
relation continues to be promoted. In January 2001, Indian
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee paid an official visit
to Vietnam. In May 2003, Secretary General Nong Duc Manh
visited India. This visit was an important landmark in the
history of bilateral relation because during this visit,
India and Vietnam signed Joint Declaration regarding
the Framework for Comprehensive Cooperation between the
two countries entering the 21st century. This is the
first joint declaration of comprehensive cooperation that
Vietnam signed with another country in the 21st century.
After that, in July 2007, Vietnam Prime Minister Nguyen
Tan Dung made an official visit to India. During this visit,
leaders of the two countries signed Joint Declaration of
Vietnam – India strategic partnership, uplifting Vietnam
– India relation to the highest level between two
countries.
Subsequent visits of high level government leaders from
Vietnam to India include the visit to India of Vice President
Nguyen Thi Doan in 2009, Chairman of the National Assembly
Nguyen Phu Trong in 2010 and most recently the visit of
President Truong Tan Sang on 12th October, 2011. From Indian
side, Speaker of Lower House Somnath Chatterjee visited
Vietnam in March 2007, President Pratibha Patil visited
Vietnam in November 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
came to Hanoi in October 2010 and Speaker of the Lower House,
Madam Meira Kumar visited Vietnam from 14th – 17th
May 2011.
Regarding trade cooperation, although bilateral
trade cooperation has not matched the depth of political
relation and potentials of the two countries, yet in recent
years, there have been very positive developments. In 2010,
Vietnam – India bilateral trade cooperation attained
the figure of 2.75 billion USD, increasing 34.3% compared
to the previous year. In the first 4 months of 2011, bilateral
trade turn-over between Vietnam and India was 1.262 billion
USD, increasing 42% compared to previous year. Both Vietnam
and India have put the target of 7 billion USD for bilateral
trade turn-over in 2015. However, it is noticeable that
in Vietnam – India trade relation, the balance of
trade has continuously been in favor of India. While it
is advantageous for India, it is very disadvantageous for
Vietnam. Regarding investment, India is among the
first countries to invest in Vietnam. The year 2007 marked
a turning point in the field of India’s investment
into Vietnam, with projects of Essar and Tata Groups in
the sphere of steel production, India became one of the
10 largest investors in Vietnam. Up to September 2011, India’s
investment into Vietnam got the figure of 500 million USD.
At present, India has 52 investment projects into Vietnam
with total registered capital of over 220 million USD. Regarding
security cooperation, this is a rather new area of
cooperation, both from Vietnam and Indian sides. This originates
from the non-aligned standpoint of India in the Cold War
era. However, since “The Protocol on Security
Cooperation” was signed in 1994 up to now, security
cooperation between the two countries has been promoted
through various high level visits of Ministries of National
Defence of the two countries, exchanges of military delegation,
Indian war ships visited Vietnam and India helps Vietnam
in training military officers. In October 2011, Minister
of the Ministry of National Defence of India, Mr. A. K.
Atony, in his visit to Vietnam, affirmed to continue to
support Vietnam in training human resources and modernizing
national military forces, expecially naval and aviational
forces of Vietnam. Besides, both Vietnam and India are increasing
cooperation to effectively cope with non-traditional security
disasters such as climate change, environment pollution,
natural calamities, energy security, HIV/AIDs and epidemics.
The level of extensive bilateral security cooperation between
India and Vietnam in recent years has been considered “to
excess the standard of normal relation between two countries”.
Regarding cultural, educational and technological cooperation,
India and Vietnam are actively promoting various programs
of cooperation. India has attracted various scientists from
all over the world to come to study and do research. In
the 1990s, cooperation in the sphere of engineering training
was given priority.
Annually, Indian government provides 110 scholarships for
Vietnam during this period. Recently, India has announced
to increase the number of ITEC scholarships for Vietnam
from 75 up to 150 from the year 2012. Vietnam receives largest
number of ITEC scholarship among the developing countries
which benefit from program of technical cooperation of India. Regarding cultural cooperation, annually, on India’s
Independent Day (15/8) and Vietnam’s National Day
(2/9) and on occasions of anniversary of diplomatic establishment
between the two countries, we organize exhibitions of arts,
introducing the beauty of the land and the people of Vietnam,
India to the people of the two countries. Simultaneously,
Indian and Vietnamese art troupes have come to perform in
the capitals and big cities of the two countries which also
contribute to the propagation of art achievements of the
two countries in the new age. Besides, Vietnam and India
also actively participate in various Film Festivals of each
other.
Cultural cooperation between Vietnam and India has also
been carried out in the field of education. For the first
time in Vietnam, the Department of Indian Studies was set
up at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities in
Ho Chi Minh City in 2000 with the first batch of 26 students.
In 2002, the Department of Indian Studies was established
at Hanoi University of Social Sciences and Humanities. Up
to now, many students have graduated from the departments
of Indian studies in the South and the North of Vietnam
and actively contributing to the promotion of Vietnam –
India relation.
Recently, on 5th July 2011, the Government of Vietnam decided
to establish the Institute of Indian and Southwest Asian
Studies, belonging to Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences.
This proves that Vietnam realizes the important role of
India and Indian studies in this period.
During the visit of Vietnam President Truong Tan Sang to
India on 12th October 2011, the two countries have agreed
to celebrate the year 2012 as Vietnam – India Friendship
Year to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the establishment
of full diplomatic relation between the two countries (1972-2012)
and 5 year of the establishment of strategic partnership
(2007-2012). India also organizes “Year of India in
Vietnam” in 2012 with various cultural events such
as art performances, film festivals, food festivals, art
exhibitions in many cities in Vietnam.
We can say that Vietnam – India relation in all spheres
as mentioned above is extremely good. There are hardly any
two countries in the world which have not had to go through
conflict and tension in the past such as the case of Vietnam
and India. The thing is that, in the new international context,
what are the advantages and disadvantages for the promotion
of Vietnam- India relation?
New international context: New international
context can be identified by the following main dimensions:
In terms of economic dimension, it is the acceleration
of globalization and regionalization. This is an objective
tendency which has impact on all spheres of social life
and on the foreign relations of all countries, including
Vietnam and India. Therefore, the question put forward is
that how the promotion of Vietnam – India relation
help the two countries to solve their own problems better.
Liberalization of trade, transfer of technology, expansion
of market…are the advantages which give India and
Vietnam opportunities to grasp new information and knowledge,
enhancing the competitive capacity of the economies and
promoting bilateral economic cooperation. In terms of
security and political dimension, it is the increasing
tendency of dialogue in bilateral and multilateral forums;
the change in the face of the relations among big countries.
The promotion of strategic partnership with Vietnam will
certainly helps India assert its position of a big power.
In terms of cultural dimension, new international
context facilitates new conditions for the absorption of
cultural values of other countries while remaining our own
traditional cultural values. Thus, every country can feel
secure to integrate internationally without losing its own
cultural identity. However, new international context also
poses great challenges. It is the emergence of terrorism
at global level, the danger of the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, threatening international security. Besides, other
non-traditional security issues such as drug traffics, money
laundering, cross-national boundary crimes, women and children
trafficking, epidemics, disparity between the rich and the
poor also require great efforts in bilateral and multilateral
cooperation. In addition, issues of energy security and
environment and climate changes are also challenges the
world has to face with in the coming decades. But even the
challenges of new international context can also be seen
as opportunities for Vietnam and India to come closer to
each other.
Prospects of Vietnam – India relation:
A retrospect of Vietnam – India relation in all spheres
of economy, politics, culture, education, technology and
national security and defence strengthens our belief in
the prospects of bilateral relation in the future. The evolution
in bilateral relation, from traditional and trusting friendship
to a strategic partnership, reflects the changes in a more
globalized and integrated world. Prospects of Vietnam –
India relations in every sphere are great. In the words
of Indian Ambassador Ranjit Rae, Vietnam continues to be
an attractive destination for Indian companies in the field
of oil and gas, steel, mineral, tea, sugar, food processing
and information technology training.
The traditional foundation of Vietnam – India relation,
India’s Look East policy, economic liberalization
and India’s potentials in information technology as
well as Vietnam’s innovation policy are advantages
which help create opportunities for the promotion of bilateral
relation. Besides, the development of East Asian link and
the issue of the Eastern Sea are also considered good opportunities
to promote India – Vietnam relation and help India
achieve its strategic goals. However, Vietnam – India
relation is still facing with many difficulties and challenges.
Some of the main difficulties are as follows:
Lack of information about each other: although Vietnam
and India are proud of their traditional friendship, yet
what we know about each other is mainly in the fields of
politics and culture. Our mutual understanding of other
necessary and useful information in the field of economy,
market and science and technology is very limited.
Difficulty in transport: although the agreement
on civil aviation between India and Vietnam was signed long
ago, up to now, we have not had direct flight between the
two countries. It is a regret that Vietnam and India are
quite close in terms of geography in Asia, but it takes
from 10 to 24 hours to travel from New Delhi to Hanoi, mainly
because we have to stop in Thailand or Malaysia to change
flights. We hope that with the event of Vietnam Airlines
and Indian Jet Airways signed a framed agreement during
the visit of President Truong Tan Sang to India on 12/10/2011,
direct flight between Vietnam and India will be established
very soon. Differences in terms of culture, religion, psychology
and habits also pose certain obstacles for bilateral
cooperation.
Issue of Eastern Sea is both an opportunity and
a challenge for both sides.
It is our contention that, for a more effective and substantial
strategic partnership between Vietnam and India, regular
political concern of the leaders of the two countries is
essential. Besides, both Vietnam and India have to develop
various research programs, increasing exchanges among business
enterprises of the two countries, people-to-people contact,
and academic exchanges… to provide information and
promote mutual understanding. In this context, role of institutions
such as Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies,
Kolkata, India and Institute of Indian and Southwest Asian
Studies, Hanoi, Vietnam is extremely important.
Despite many difficulties, we can see that, Vietnam –
India relation continues to grow steadily and has achieved
great successes. With these achievements, we believe that
Vietnam – India strategic partnership will develop
strongly in the future, meeting the expectation of the governments
and peoples of the two countries in the years to come.
India-Vietnam
Ties: Retrospect and Prospect
Dipanjan Ray Chaudhury, Diplomatic Correspondent, Mail Today,
New Delhi
Direct
flights to Vietnam have been lacking. And this impedes the
implementation of India’s Look east Policy; direct
flight between the two capitals of the world is the most
important area of cooperation in building people to people
contact. The other area of people to people contact which
can only grow in future is a Buddhist circuit in India which
not many people have focused on or dealt with because it
was unnoticed that in the last couple of years, particularly
in the last two years lot of followers from Vietnam have
been travelling to India in large batches particularly to
Bodh Gaya and Sarnath. Why don’t we institutionalize
this circuit of Buddhism between India and Vietnam like
India has been focusing on Cambodia or Thailand –
lot of Thai tourists come to India on this Buddhist circuit.
When it comes to another aspect of people to people contact,
the Vietnamese side has been requesting India for English
Language training, like we have been doing in Central Asia
and Africa. But the Government of India has been emphasizing
much on English Language training in Vietnam. Vietnam also
wants to develop along the lines of Philippines and Sri
Lanka as an outsourcing hub. Why not encourage the training
trend – have APTECH or NIIT set up stops where there
will be students. They can be provided with appropriate
IT training that they have been looking for.
Institutionalizing the naval exercises can be a key area
of cooperation. There have been on and of naval exercises
between the two countries, which could be expanded to have
some of the ASEAN member countries in the region, including
South Korea and Japan. We could think of a trilateral defense
exercise with Vietnam, S. Korea and Japan and probably later
include Philippines also because these countries in South
East Asia and East Asia with whom India’s defense
cooperation has expanded. Largely unnoticed in media is
Indo-S. Korean defense ties. When defense minister A. K.
Anthony went last year there were two key agreements that
were signed between S. Korea and India.
The India-Japan defense ties have been expanding and not
much focus is given on that and Indo-Vietnam defense tires
have been very steadily growing, so why not expand it to
first make it a bilateral annual exercise and then make
it a trilateral naval defense exercise. Obviously this is
going to draw some attention and ire from the larger Northern
neighbor –but it can always be done in the spirit
of East Asia security architecture where China is also a
member and it can also send the message wherever it wants
in terms of the balance of power in the region.
We can also think of inviting Vietnamese defense personnel
to our war colleges to expand the defense cooperation, the
understanding among the members of the defense community
in the two countries. Vietnam has been demanding Brahmos
missile from India in terms of military hardware. There
has been some dithering on India’s part and the requisite
nod from Russia has not been coming and this area should
be also looked in when we try to develop defense partnership.
One area which makes Indo-Vietnamese ties natural is India
and Vietnam both use Soviet platform of defense which automatically
makes way for defense cooperation, particularly hardware
cooperation and training, exchange between the two countries.
This often does not and need not always be discussed in
the public domain. It is easier for defense cooperation
between the two countries After the signing of the claimed
NSG waiver in September 2008 India had signed nuclear cooperation
agreement with almost 10 countries. One of the countries
here is Japan. Japan even after the Fukushima tragedy declares
that it is cooperating. It made its nuclear discussions
with four countries public and one of the countries is Vietnam,
besides Russia and Jordan, they are cooperating within the
nuclear field.
India has been keen to export medium level nuclear reactors
to various countries and Vietnam has a history of peaceful
nuclear research. India and Vietnam can look into the future
of India nuclear cooperation, science and technology cooperation
and probably acquire Russia’s help in building nuclear
research and nuclear power plants in Vietnam.
One of the key areas of cooperation is ASEAN as a multilateral
forum. India has mentioned that Vietnam is India’s
closest ASEAN partner, but that has not been translated
into a stronger bilateral relationship. India is hosting
the ASEAN Delhi Dialogue IV currently in Delhi. Vietnam’s
Ambassador is also participating in it. Why can’t
we look at transforming this multilateral forum into a bilateral
initiative? This should remain in the thought process of
the South Block.
Geographically, Vietnam is in the Indian Ocean region, where
India is slowly expanding its footprints. One could refer
about China containing India’s role in the Indian
Ocean region. If Indian Ocean region is not India’s
ocean, South China Sea cannot be China’s sea. If China
can be present in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, by the same
logic India can be present in the South China Sea. If that
be business then why can’t India have business in
the South China Sea? It makes India’s presence in
the South China Sea strong and the agreements that were
signed during the Vietnam President’s visit here to
expand cooperation makes India’s presence more legitimate
in the region, particularly in the Exclusive Economic Zones
of Vietnam.
Barack Obama, while announcing the last defense cut in budget
mentioned that India should be a player in the region. In
terms of the East Asian security architecture, India can
play a role in that area. India is the only country in the
region which besides China wants to develop blue water navy.
India is the only country in the region which has an aircraft
carrier. It is developing an aircraft carrier and it is
getting one from Russia. It is the only country with three
aircraft carriers in the region. Vietnam can play a role
in developing India’s blue water navy, in expanding
India’s naval reach in particularly S.E Asia, leading
up to East Asia.
Another key area in terms of information exchange and people
to people exchange between the two countries could be the
visits by media and Vietnam has a presence here of the news
agency, but unfortunately there is hardly any presence of
Indian media in Vietnam, or visits by Indian media to Vietnam.
So there can be a role in promoting this, given the nature
of the Indian polity. If the Indian media organizations
can think of posting somewhere in Vietnam and having a kind
of arrangement where their news agencies can send their
correspondents and he or she can cover the entire region
from there. This would help more exchange of information
between the two countries and given that India is keen to
expand its footprints in S.E Asia it can further enhance
the process.
.....
At
the end of the third session, it was pointed out that cyber-warfare
needs attention as information exchange is imperiled by
it. Substantial ground work through strategies must be made
to create a deterrence effect to our adversaries. It was
asked what kind of role can be envisaged for India-Vietnam
in the wake of US’s return in the Asia-Pacific. Prof.
Binh stated that India can promote defence and security
cooperation with Vietnam. It was suggested that US’s
return maybe a positive thing as India’s relations
with the US are good in terms of strategic ties. In fact,
China’s negative impact can be offset by India-Vietnam
ties. Mr. Dipanjan Ray Chaudhury offered that it is the
age of multi-vector foreign policy and Vietnam’s relation
with Russia, the US, Israel and India-all is growing. Dr.
Pradhan summed up that independent foreign policy will be
carved out by interests. It is imperative for India and
Vietnam to rationally juxtapose the inter-play of contested
geo-strategic interests in the region with the need to pursue
continuities in foreign relations and engage in fresh avenues
of engagement for the optimal cultivation of bilateral ties.
As the countries celebrate forty years of their diplomatic
ties and friendship in 2012, Global India Foundation was
able to bring together the viewpoints of India and Vietnam
and substantially review the variables steering India-Vietnam
relations and avenues to infuse a fresh spirit of cooperation.
The Conference was concluded with a vote of thanks proposed
by Ms. Cauvery Ganapathy.
Conference
Schedule
India-Myanmar
Relations: Strengthening Ties and Deepening Engagements
India
International Centre (Annexe), New Delhi, India
Wednesday, 15th February 2012
Inaugural: 10:30am-11:15am
Welcome:
Ms.Cauvery Ganapathy, Fellow, GIF
Brief Remarks: Prof.Omprakash Mishra, Member Secretary,
GIF and Dr.Sreeradha Datta, Director, MAKAIAS
Inaugural Address: Amb.Ranjan Mathai, Foreign Secretary,
Government of India
Chair: Vice Admiral P.J.Jacob, Chairman, GIF
Vote of Thanks
Tea
– 11:15 am -11:30am
Session I – 11:30am- 1:00pm
Myanmar’s Geo-Strategic Location: India’s
Gateway to ASEAN – Challenges and Opportunities
Chair: Daw Yin Yin Myint (Director General, Myanmar Institute
of Strategic and International Studies (MSIS), Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Yangon, Myanmar)
Amb.Rajiv Bhatia, Former Indian Ambassador to Myanmar
Dr.Tin Htoo Naing, National Consultant, ASEAN 2030 Study,
Asian Development Bank Institute, Yangon, Myanmar: ‘India-Myanmar
Relations: Myanmar Perspective’
Dr.Ishani Naskar, Faculty, Rabindra Bharati University:
‘Relooking India’s Myanmar Policy: Consider
Myanmar within South Asia?’
Mr. Pradeep Phanjoubam, Editor, Imphal Free Press, Imphal,
Manipur
Lunch-
1:00pm-2:00pm
Session II- 2:00pm – 3:15pm
North-East Region of India and Myanmar
Chair: Amb.Salman Haidar (Former Foreign Secretary, GOI
and Member, Executive Council, GIF)
1. Dr.Gurudas Das, Faculty, National Institute of Technology,
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Silchar –
‘Implications of Engaging Myanmar for India’s
North East: Trade, Transit and Security’
2. Dr. Rakhee Bhattacharya, Fellow, Rajiv Gandhi Institute
for Contemporary Studies, Delhi– ‘Stilwell Road-
the Road to Hope for North-East India’
3. Dr.Prabir De, Fellow, Research and Information System
for Developing Countries –‘India-Myanmar Connectivity:
Projects and Implications for India’s Northeast’
4. Ms.Sayantani Sen Mazumdar, Fellow, GIF – ‘Moreh
to Myanmar: Look East and its Promising Engagements’
Session
III - 4:30pm-5:30pm
Political and Economic Partnership between India
and Myanmar
Chair: Prof. Samir Kumar Das (Professor, Department of Political
Science, University of Calcutta and Member, Executive Council,
GIF)
1. Dr. Amita Batra, Faculty, South Asian Study, Jawaharlal
Nehru University, Delhi: ‘India Myanmar: Evolving
Economic Relationship’
2. Dr. C.J.Thomas, Acting Director, ICSSR- North-East Regional
Council, Shillong – ‘Trade and Cooperation across
the border: Need for a bold and balanced policy towards
India-Myanmar Border Trade’
3. Dr. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Fellow, Institute of South
East Asian Studies, Singapore – ‘ASEAN’s
Ambivalent Views of India Myanmar Relations’
Vote
of Thanks
Conference
Picture
(A) (B)
(C)
(D) (E)
(A)
Amb. Ranjan Mathai, Foreign Secretary, Govt. of India
(B) From L to R: Dr. Tin Htoo Naing, Amb. Rajiv Bhatia,
Ms. Daw Yin Yin Myint, Dr. Ishani Naskar and Mr. Pradeep
Phanjoubam
(C) A cross-section of the participating audience
(D) From L to R: Dr. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Dr. Amita Batra,
Prof. Samir K Das and Dr. C J Thomas
(E) From L to R: Ms. Sayantani Sen, Prof. Omprakash Mishra,
Admiral P J Jacob and Ms. Cauvery Ganapathy
Global
India Foundation, in collaboration with Maulana Abul Kalam
Azad Institute of Asian Studies (MAKAIAS), Kolkata, Institute
of Foreign Policy Studies, University of Kolkata and Gamesa,
India organized an International Conference on India Myanmar
Relations: Strengthening Ties and Deepening Engagements on February 15, 2012. The theme of the Conference encompassed
a wide array of pertinent issues ranging from ‘Myanmar’s
Geo-Strategic Location: India’s Gateway to ASEAN –
Challenges and Opportunities to North-East Region of India
and Myanmar and Political and Economic Partnership between
India and Myanmar.
The inaugural session was presided over by Vice Admiral
P.J Jacob, Chairman, Global India Foundation (GIF), Dr.
Sreeradha Dutta, Director , Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute
of Asian Studies,(MAKAIAS), Daw Yin Yin Myint (Director
General, Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International
Studies (MSIS), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yangon, Myanmar,
Prof.Omprakash Mishra, Member Secretary, GIF. Ambassador
Ranjan Mathai, Foreign Secretary, Government of India delivered
a special address.
Admiral Jacob reiterated the efficacy of
the Foundation in organizing a series of conferences focusing
on India’s critical bilateral ties with a host of
countries. Prof. Mishra commenced his speech by commenting
on the role of academicians and the Ministry of External
Affairs (MEA), Government of India in highlighting the strategic
significance of cooperative engagements between India and
Myanmar. He stated that the entire discourse on renewed
engagement with Myanmar, which is steered by the MEA, is
indeed very commendable. India shares a crucial relationship
with Myanmar and the essence of the robust engagements between
the two countries is the relevant way of translating the
substance of the Look East Policy (LEP) into reality. LEP
which was re-launched in 2007 with a new vigour by the then
External Affairs Minister, Shri Pranab Mukherjee’s
speech in Shillong on “Geography as an Opportunity”
emphasized the strategic importance of Myanmar in translating
our LEP. The magnitude of India’s engagements with
Myanmar and the zeal in implementing initiatives and policies,
portray India’s profound interest in enhancing cooperative
endeavours with Myanmar. Myanmar is the focal-point by which
the LEP can be translated into actuality. Indo-Myanmar cooperation
can be cited as an example of successful stories of India’s
engagements with its neighbour. He emphasized that South
Asia is being conceptualized within a limited perspective.
Global India Foundation thus conducts research on the wider
scope of the South Asian region. Notwithstanding the conceptual
construct of South Asia, significance lies in the impact
of each country beyond the regional sphere, in places like
Afghanistan, China and Myanmar. The South Asian region can
definitely benefit if we take into account the interdependent
effects of the sum of all the constructive efforts currently
underway.
In his keynote speech, Ambassador Mathai characterized the
relationship between the two countries as deep-rooted and
multifaceted. He stated that our “close, friendly
and good neighbourly relations” have been further
strengthened through exchanges in recent times, including
the State Visit of the Honorable President of Myanmar to
India in October 2010. Our bilateral relations, always cordial,
have acquired new range, depth and vitality over the past
decade or so. The historic, cultural and societal connections
are obvious: Our shared Buddhist heritage is one of many
unique and abiding bonds. Our peoples living across the
border share ties of language, culture and history so much
so that some of our Laws refer to the “Kingdom of
Ava”. Myanmar is our only, land bridge to South East
Asia and the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations. It is therefore a crucial player in the implementation
of India’s Look East Policy, a policy which was aimed
at strengthening India’s relations with all ASEAN
member states in particular. Today, as Myanmar makes a transition
to a democratic system, our relations are set to move to
a higher plane, with political, commercial and people-to-people
cooperation assuming greater prominence in the relationship.
The recent developments in Myanmar have evoked great interest
amongst the international community. The government has
set itself an ambitious agenda of achieving good governance
and clean government, rule of law, securing the fundamental
rights of citizens, reducing income disparity, creating
a harmonious society, and bringing about economic reform
and environmental conservation.
Ambassador
Mathai observed that in the realm of foreign policy, Myanmar
is keeping good relations with all its neighbours and partners.
India views improvement of relations as a win-win proposition.
Domestically a dialogue has been offered with the National
League for Democracy (NLD) leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as
well as the leaders of ethnic armed groups and this dialogue
started showing results. The community of PIOs – more
than a million strong – is symbolic of our organic
links as nations. As Myanmar enters a new economic era –
there are hopes for their economic progress as an integral
part of the Myanmar nation. India has been in dialogue with
Myanmar for fifteen years on the concept of an inclusive
process of national reconciliation. We, therefore, find
the nature and extent of debate in the newly convened Parliament
heartening, with legislators working to amend existing legislation
and also to seek answers to questions of public interest.
We believe these steps could lead to a more democratic government.
For our part, the Indian Government stands ready to offer
such support as is useful and relevant for the Myanmar Government
in its transition to a democratic system. We have stepped
up our political engagement - President U Thein Sein visited
India in October 2011, the Myanmar Foreign Minister U Wunna
Maung Lwin in January 2012, our own External Affairs Minister
Shri S.M. Krishna, in June 2011. We are ready to share our
experience and help in capacity building - The Lower House
Speaker Thura U Shwe Mann led a parliamentary delegation
on a study visit in December 2011 and we discussed sharing
of our experience on parliamentary procedures and practice.
We are expecting a delegation from the National Human Rights
Commission of Myanmar in March this year. We are considering
ways and means of assisting Myanmar as it prepares to take
on ASEAN Chairmanship in 2014.
The
Government of India is ready to work together with the Myanmar
Government to accelerate the process of development in the
areas bordering India. This has traditionally been viewed
as an area of common security concern but it is also a new
economic frontier. We have cooperated against armed insurgency;
however, it is the planned connectivity and development
projects in the Rakhine and Chin States and Sagaing Region
which are today of especial importance. The Tamu-Kale-Kalewa
Road project has been most beneficial to the people in the
Tamu area. We hope that it can be expanded and become part
of the Asian Highway.The range of areas covered by India-Myanmar
development cooperation projects is diverse and carefully
chosen — apart from roads, we have active projects
in railways, telecom, health, agriculture, energy, IT and
education. In order to enhance capacity amongst the Myanmar
youth, we have set up the Myanmar-India Centre for English
Language Training, Yangon, Myanmar-India Entrepreneurship
Development Centre, Yangon, India-Myanmar Centre for Enhancement
of IT Skills, Yangon and the Industrial Training Centre
in Pakokku. Another Industrial Training Centre is being
set up at Myingyan. We are also working on setting up IT
Institute in Mandalay. All these institutes have been conceptualized
keeping the needs of the Myanmar student and industrial
community in mind and we are very happy to learn that their
work is being appreciated and that the graduates from these
Centres are finding jobs easily.
The
current state of Indo-Myanmar commercial relations is healthy
- but way below its potential. Annual bilateral trade amounts
to USD 1.4 billion at present and we have mutually agreed
to set a target of doubling bilateral trade to $3 billion
by 2015. The balance of trade has always been in favor of
Myanmar. As per Myanmar statistics, India is Myanmar’s
fifth largest trade partner – its 4th largest export
destination and 7th largest source of imports. India’s
main exports, which amounted to USD 195 million in 2010-11,
are pharmaceuticals, meat and meat products, electrical
machinery, etc. India’s imports, which amounted to
USD 876 million in the same year, are dominated by pulses,
(the dal which is the common man’s diet in India)
and beans and timber including teak. Greater investment
in necessary – currently, as per Myanmar official
statistics, Indian investment is just USD 189 million. This
however does not reflect an investment of USD 1.33 billion
by ONGC and GAIL. The prospects are good, especially as
India has just entered into an FTA with the ASEAN. Overall,
India–ASEAN trade has been increasing rapidly in recent
years and amounted to US$ 57.9 billion in 2010–11,
constituting about 10 % of India’s global trade. This
positive trend should also reflect on India-Myanmar trade.
Indian companies are actively assessing opportunities in
Myanmar. The response to the Enterprise India Show held
in Yangon in November 2011 was excellent and many Indian
companies are engaged in follow-up activity.
Ambassador
Mathai stated that the Government of India is conscious
of the need for better land, air and sea connectivity between
the two countries in order to facilitate trade and are working
with the Myanmar authorities to this end. People-to-people
contacts is another area of focus – India has been
extending courtesies to Buddhist pilgrims from Myanmar and
also tried to encourage more tourist visits by extending
our tourist visa-on-arrival scheme to Myanmar nationals.
We are looking at requests for Myanmar monasteries which
could serve as pilgrims rest. At the other end, we are happy
to be undertaking the Conservation and Renovation of the
historic Ananda Temple in Bagan with technical support from
the Archaeological Survey of India. We hope to soon sign
a Cultural Exchange Programme which will systematize the
cultural interaction between our countries. Ambassador Mathai
expressed his belief that as Myanmar continues on the new
path charted out by its leaders, the strong ties between
our two countries will only deepen and strengthen further.
Our destinies are closely linked on land and on the sea.
As our relations grow a new identity will be created. Myanmar
will increasingly rediscover part of its South Asian heritage,
just as India will discover that just as in historical times
we are part of South East Asia itself.
Ms.
Daw Yin Yin Mint pointed out that Myanmar as the
only ASEAN country sharing land and maritime boundary with
India. She enumerated the importance of dialogues on critical
bilateral ties and its impact on vital relations. The thrust
of the think-tanks in different parts of the region is to
critically gauge the future course of India-Myanmar relations.
Drawing inferences from the Foreign Secretary’s special
address, she focused on the relevance of high-level official
visits. In this context she cited the visits made by the
new President of Myanmar to India in October 2010 and the
Foreign Minister in January 2012. These dual visits, according
to her, built essentially important ground for cooperation,
mutual benefits for India and Myanmar. Moreover, she made
references to the preparations being made by Myanmar for
a visit of Indian Prime Minister which would take place
for BIMSTEC Summit in Napidyaw. She observed that the upcoming
high level visits in an indicative of an upward swing in
Indo-Myanmar cooperation. She expressed her belief that
with these visits new avenues of cooperation would be identified,
new vistas would be opened up. Myanmar bridges the North
East states of Manipur, Mizoram, Assam with the ASEAN countries.
Drawing inferences from Ambassador Mathai’s speech,
Prof. Mishra highlighted the increasing relevance of Indo-Myanmar
cooperation and made a special mention of India’s
North-East in the context of India’s LEP.
The first session was on Myanmar’s Geo-Strategic
location- India’s gateway to ASEAN: Opportunities
and Challenges.
India-Myanmar
Cooperation
Ambassador Rajiv Bhatia, Former Indian Ambassador to Myanmar
This
presentation tries to outline the tenets of critical bilateral
cooperation between India and Myanmar. From the geo-strategic
significance of the location of Myanmar it is pertinent
to mention that it is the intersection for South East Asia
and South Asia, for ASEAN and SAARC, for the one of the
most underdeveloped member-states (Myanmar) with one of
the more prosperous member-states (Thailand) of ASEAN. Myanmar
is the land where the Asian landmass touches the Indian
Ocean, providing alternative routes to eastern India and
southern China. Myanmar is vital for security and development
of North East Region of India and has inevitable impact
on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands area. Thus Myanmar’s
geographic location bears immense geo-strategic significance.
By emphasizing on Indo-Myanmar deep historical bonding he
enumerated the relevance of the cooperation in the backdrop
of India’s Look East Policy and Indo-ASEAN collaboration.
Thus come into fore the essentiality of the deepening and
the expansion of connectivity, which pertains to four areas:
physical (i.e. infrastructure – rail, road, sea, air,
energy etc.); IT and HRD; institutions; and mind space,
especially with reference to a long-term strategic perspective
that requires the deployment of India's industrial prowess,
technological resources and various attributes of soft power.
Challenges
inherent in this course of cooperation are also being dealt
with in detail by the expert on Indo-Myanmar relations.
He focused on certain core issues like: G-to G links are
marred by two imbalances: more stress on security than economic
development; more reliance on officialdom than on political
class, B-to-B exchanges: India Inc still seems to be still
holding back, complaining of uncertainty and operational
problems in Myanmar and unmindful of approaching competition.
P-to-P equation is characterized by a huge asymmetry: India's
Myanmar experts and scholars are engaged in conversations
among themselves (with very few exceptions); instead, they
should be talking to their counterparts in Myanmar on a
sustained basis. Walls erected that bar such conversations
should be brought down fast before Myanmar gets fully engaged
talking to others – the Chinese, the Americans, the
Europeans, the Japanese and the Australians. More tourism,
more cultural linkages, more educational cooperation is
needed. A composite holistic approach welding together bilateral,
sub-regional and regional dimensions of India’s Myanmar
policy is recommended. A special emphasis to the North-East
Region is the ardent need of the cooperative endeavour.
This crucial bilateral cooperation should be well-structured
to address to the constraints and challenges of the day.
India-Myanmar
Relations from Myanmar’s Perspective
Dr. Tin Htoo Naing, National Consultant, ASEAN 2030 Study,
Asian Development Bank Institute, Yangon, Myanmar
This
paper studies the disparate paradigms of Indo-Myanmar relations
from an economic perspective. South East Asia and India,
two of the fastest growing and most dynamic regions, should
capitalize on their partnership through enhanced connectivity
to reap the optimum benefits. Myanmar is the only land bridge
between South East Asia and India and is the largest country
of South East Asia covering about 678000 square kilometers.
On 30th March 2011 with the formation of the new government
reforms in economic policies and procedures were formulated
which were largely the off shoots of past experiences. New
constitution in 2008 enumerates the formation of market
economy in Myanmar. India is thus assuming a vital role
in changing political, economic, strategic future of Myanmar.
Myanmar has undergone the following development phases:
Parliamentary democracy with mixed economy (1948-1962; socialist
military rule with extreme state control (1962-1988); military
supremacy with market orientation (1988-1997); military
with market orientation and strong state intervention (1997-2011);
progressively democratic market economy (2011- present).
For the future development of the country there has to be
a proactive role of the government. The government needs
to take measures to improve the standard of living of rural
economy and agricultural sector. In 2008-2009 share of agricultural
sector was 41.7%, industrial sector was 21.2% and services
sector 37.1%. Economy still depends on resource based industries
like oil, gas mining and forestry. Growth rate is slow in
service sector, which is about 31%. The incompetence in
promoting economy is responsible for the slow growth of
the economy though foreign investment of Permitted Enterprises
till 30/11/11 has considerably increased in terms of US$
in million (about 2.5% increase in 11/2 years). In 2010-2011
there was considerable increase in FDI sources. China, Thailand,
Hong Kong account for nearly 74 % of investments followed
by Republic of Korea ie 7.3%, UK -6.6%, Singapore-4.5%.
FDI from India is very marginal – only 2.5% of total
FDI. About 90% of FDI in Myanmar comes from Asia and ASEAN
which accounts for 32%. 80% of investments are done in power
and oil gas industries. In manufacturing sector there is
only 4.3% of total FDI.
Myanmar is still considered to be risky destination due
to poor infrastructure and transport facilities. Though
highway projects have been initiated which have helped neighbouring
countries to access roads from Myanmar But share of benefits
of Myanmar is quite negligible. Myanmar cannot only be treated
as food basket, energy hub, other spheres of opportunities
should also need to be focused. The connectivity projects
bear the potentialities of enhancing the strategic importance
of Myanmar as a regional logistics and trading hub and thus
would be definitely beneficial for Myanmar, India, and ASEAN
and for the entire region. To realize the positive outcomes
Myanmar needs to respond to the opportunities offered by
its geographical and natural advantages and must avail the
competitive advantages brought about by regional and global
market chain.
Re-Looking
India’s Myanmar Policy: Consider Myanmar within South
Asia?
Dr. Ishani Naskar, Faculty, Rabindra Bharati University
Indo-Myanmar
relations can be critically examined by evoking certain
cardinal queries like-is the concept of South Asia complete
or infallible? Why Myanmar is excluded from South Asia?
Why does it seem that India is lacking an active neighbourly
relationship with Myanmar based on determined bilateralism?
Myanmar is India’s eastern neighbour and the other
is China. Geographically Myanmar is a part of South Asia
and institutionally is a member of South East Asian family.
It is in a way queer that while all of India’s neighbours
are a part of South Asia, Myanmar stands apart as an exception.
South
Asia can be conceptualized from different perspectives-
geographical, cultural, historical and politico-strategic.
Geographically, it is coterminous with the landmass called
Indian subcontinent has a marine sphere covering the Indian
Ocean. Culturally, we can trace the trajectory from the
concept of Greater Indian system based on cultural similarities
spread across the entire area. Historically, apart from
the obvious linkage in the ancient and medieval period,
basic focus is on pre-independence British India as an immediate
context for contemporary references to South Asia. Strategically,
in international politics, South Asia emerged as one of
the theatres of Cold War competition propelled on India-Pakistan
rivalry. Politically, the indigenous concept of South Asia
based on the functional definition of what constitutes SAARC.
However, the contemporary contours of South Asia is not
infallible and could be subjected to modifications according
to strategic considerations and emerging political scenario
like the induction of Afghanistan in 2005. There is a need
to bring Myanmar within the purview of South Asia so that
the possibility of a durable neighbourhood policy towards
this country can be enhanced. Taking recourse to history,
such a modification can be justified. If South Asia is expanding
its family by bringing Afghanistan within its ambit, then
why is Burma not being included, when there is clear mention
of South Asian Registrar in 1827 (that mentions Burma and
also Australia). In pre independence period Burma found
a place within South Asia. Administrative policies in British
India-Inclusion of Burma in India and its separation was
a purely British decision for administrative purposes. Included
both Lower (1858) and Upper Burma (1886) within British
India. Burma was converted into a separate British domain
in 1937 and hence, separated from India. But it remained
India’s neighbour even before her independence and
even before the birth of Pakistan.
India’s
role as a prominent global player that had launched from
the NAM failed to provide enough dividends at the regional
level and NAM thus failed to prove its credibility. The
concept of South Asia was institutionalized by countries
of the region in the 1980s following the establishment of
SAARC. Two questions that come to one’s mind in this
respect- the idea was conceived by India’s neighbours
but not by India, the reason why all the border states of
India found place in South Asia excepting Myanmar. India
never thought of regional entity seriously. SAARC determined
the contours of what constitutes South Asia based on a functional
definition. In not pursuing for Myanmar’s membership
in SAARC, India was losing out in bilateral relations. Myanmar’s
inclusion could have ensured a better way to engage Myanmar’s
rigid regime.
In the re-launch of India-Myanmar relations, there were
certain key drivers like economic and strategic compulsions,
connectivity and communication acting as a gateway to Southeast
Asia, and finally, India’s Look East prism reaching
out to the neighbouring countries and conceiving Myanmar
as a part of South East Asia. In charting the future trajectory
of India-Myanmar relations, it would be important to re-conceive
South Asia as inclusive of Myanmar. If all of India’s
bordering neighbours are members of SAARC, then Myanmar
as the eastern neighbour should be a member of SAARC, and
represent South Asia. India largely needs a set of strong
and proactive neighbourhood policies of which Myanmar must
be an inseparable part. India should prioritize the bilateral
approach to an instrumental orientation, encourage competition
instrumental in enhancing engagement, must be oriented towards
consistent bilateralism and successful multilateralism.
As a neighbour Myanmar is important not only for Look East
Policy, other priorities are also there. Competition with
China is there but it should not only be the guiding spirit
of healthy engagement. Myanmar’s advantageous geostrategic
location adds a boom to the cooperation as that the country
is India’s gateway to South East Asia. There should
be a strong mutual urge to build upon this reality, thereby
bringing Myanmar within the purview of SA in order to ensure
strong neighbourly relations with India.
Look
East Policy: Beyond Trade and Commerce
Mr. Pradip Phanjoubam, Editor, Imphal Free Press, Imphal,
Manipur
The
tendency of India’s Look East Policy is to focus on
the trade prospects between India and South East Asia and
this has the likelihood of bypassing the North East. Focusing
on the significance of Indo-Myanmar bilateral ties there
are certain core historical facts. There is a definite dearth
of knowledge on Myanmarese history. Though there is much
hype about LEP actually we are looking towards West, in
East we know a bit about Bangladesh but we lack understanding
about Myanmar. If one cites historical inferences from Thant
Myint-U’s writings, The Making of Burma then it would
be clear that initially Myanmar was a part of British India
but afterwards it was separated for political and administrative
reasons otherwise it would still have been a part of British
India. Then the history of this region would have been entirely
different. Practically the significance of political matters
over geographic ones and vice versa varies depending upon
the relevance of the situation. This happens in NER and
many other states due to the varied perspectives of different
leaders. The prevailing ethnic problems of Myanmar are the
most predominant weakness of Myanmar. Myanmar does not only
denote the question of economics, GDP, mineral resources
but also ethnic problems whose severity should also be needed
to be considered. Social repercussions due to political
upheaval should also be taken into account. He took recourse
to the historical facts of 1962, world war-2 and 1885 in
context of India-Myanmar relations. All the aspects –social,
political, economic, ethnic play a pivotal role in the historical
context of Myanmar’s transition to democracy. India
and Myanmar have experienced rough course in their historical
endeavours, nowadays though we speak about cooperation at
official level problems still exist in practical context.
LEP of India was initiated in the early 1990s and the importance
of the NER was overlooked even after 10 years of the formulation
of the Policy. Presently, only two aspects of the LEP are
in the limelight- trade aspect gets greater mileage and
the other core aspect is the political push. In Thant Myint-U’s
writings there was a description of China’s Yunan
Policy which was altogether a political move. He made a
detailed comparative study of India’s Look East Policy
and China’s Look West Policy which is related to the
Kunming Initiative and arrived at some relevant findings.
Mekong Ganga Cooperation Initiative, which was meant to
develop the NER, deserves special mention in this context.
On the basis of being an eye-witness to the developments
of this region, it can be asserted that China has made huge
investments in Mekong River. The entire Mekong River is
dominated by Chinese vessels. Chinese knows Mekong River
better than anyone else as their vessels ply the river.
India boasts about Kalemyo Road but beyond a certain point
the investment and construction is extremely poor compared
to the Chinese initiative. So in addition to economic perspective
the LEP does have political orientation.
The NER can uphold the picture of ascertaining how politics
can take precedence over geographical congeniality. For
instance, Chicken’s Neck never existed in history.
It came into existence only from 1947 after Partition. The
riots of Calcutta, Punjab, and Lahore always come to the
limelight but the riots of the NER have never attained any
academic or media coverage. To prove the authenticity of
his statement the linguistic tussle between Assamese and
Bengalis before Partition can be referred to. In 1878 Bengali
was made the official language which was vehemently protested
by the Assamese. During Partition the nature of the friction
almost got changed and the religious type of nationalism
came to the fore. Linguistic nationalism went below the
surface. Province of Sylhet in Bangladesh is actually a
Hindu dominated province and the people wanted to be a part
of Assam, but the Hindu dominated province became a part
of East Pakistan. The dialogues and discussions on the LEP
never pay heed to the Yandapu line, the implications of
the line on the NER. Truly speaking, LEP has always been
a euphoria in NER and very little has been studied on NER.
Trade between India and ASEAN rose exponentially to about
1.5 billion under the LEP but the outcome has unfortunately
not been experienced in the NER. The question of integration
nowadays has gained momentum leaving far behind the importance
of nationalism. NER is a natural region and the World War-2,
and Stilwell Road are historical instances to prove that
the Region is a natural region. Though there is visible
friction between the ASEAN countries and the GMS countries,
the region can become a pivotal area of economic importance.
The campaign from the point of view of the North East must
be to call for a two-pronged approach or to put it another
way, have two different but related components of the same
Policy. One can be to promote and facilitate trade between
India and ASEAN, which is heavily weighted towards the sea
routes and the beneficiaries on the Indian side would be
the Indian states on the rim of Bay of Bengal and the land
route via the North East has remained secondary due to poor
infrastructural facilities. He surmised that there must
be a “Look East Policy” in general and “
Look North East and Beyond Policy”. The first is a
trade policy and the second is as much a political measure
with a trade policy as a facilitator and a catalyst.
*****
The
end of the first session was followed by an interactive
and stimulating discussion on the crux of Indo-Myanmar relations.
The Chair Ms. Daw Yin Yin Myint pointed out that there are
ample avenues of cooperation between India and Myanmar.
Myanmar and India are linked by geography, history, culture,
religion and people to people ties for centuries. She highlighted
the importance of geo-strategic location of Myanmar as India’s
gateway to ASEAN. She also stated that it is imperative
to understand the development trajectory in Myanmar for
a fruitful India-Myanmar cooperation. For India to implement
it LEP completely, Myanmar needs to play a significant role
as it bridges India with the rest of ASEAN. Myanmar is provides
the base for physical connectivity between India and ASEAN
because as Myanmar has opened up to outside investments
and embarked upon a path of democracy and market economy.
Many avenues of cooperation thus lie for the stake-holders.
Delegations are rushing to Myanmar to seek opportunities
and find out potential areas of cooperation. India is assisting
Myanmar in its reform projects and has kindly offered assistance
in a wide range of areas such as telecommunications, education,
trade and commerce, agriculture, IT sectors. She points
out that there are primarily three potential areas for cooperation
wherein Myanmar stakeholders can seek for. In case of agriculture,
Myanmar is second after Canada in exporting beans, pulses
and thus has a huge market in India. Population of Indian
middle class in Myanmar would be more than1 million in next
year-thus huge potential for cooperation. Most of the temples
in Myanmar are being built by King Ashoke. Cultural and
religious affinities largely exist between India and Myanmar.
Cultural and religious affinities are the avenues to tap
into the cultural and religious tourism. Another area of
cooperation is that of physical connectivity- cooperation
in terms of infrastructure, direct gateway to ASEAN. Since
it is the direct route to ASEAN the North East Region of
India can avail the opportunities for its overall development
and Myanmar will also enjoy the benefits of having more
developed infrastructure The Kaladan Multimodal Transport
Project is of considerable importance . It will transport
goods to and from Mizoram to Myanmar vis-à-vis ASEAN.
It has to be admitted that we know very little about each
other and there are many parts of India which are foreign
to Myanmar, specially this NER. Destinies of India and Myanmar
are linked and it will be deepened if we could tap into
all these potentials and the business sector needs to be
involved in this enterprising venture. She had been skeptical
about the pace of interaction between Myanmar business people
and the Indian counterparts but she stated that the Indian
Embassy in Yangon and the Ambassadors, Staff are working
hard to involve Indian business sectors largely in Myanmar.
There is an ardent need to pursue all the competent tasks
successfully for the enriching of mutual prosperity as Myanmar
is of immense significance to India and ASEAN.
Some pressing questions were raised like is there any specific
Myanmar’s policy to attract foreign investment from
India? What are the security interests in Indo-Myanmar relations?
What are the expectations of India from Kunming Initiative
since already 9 meetings have been held and 10th meeting
is due to take place in India? It was agreed that there
is the need to scrutinize the problems inherent in steering
projects forward like the Kaladan and Tamanthi Projects
and promote proactive cooperative endeavours to eradicate
the problems. The China factor is important in case of Indo-Myanmar
relations. Myanmar reaction is quite fluctuating in respect
to China but at the same time it is dependant on China.
India’s perceptions are influenced by China factor
to a great extent. Myanmar is getting too close to China
out of compulsion as mentioned by Bertin Lintner. There
is apprehension of Indian domination of Myanmar as well
as Chinese domination of Myanmar. Natural linkages between
India and Myanmar should be revived in order to appraise
the depth of their mutual cooperation.The
theme of the second session was North-East
Region of India and Myanmar. The session was chaired
by Ambassador Salman Haidar and paper presentations were
made by Dr. Gurudas Das, Dr. Rakhee Bhattacharjee, Dr. Prabir
De and Ms Sayantani Sen Mazumdar.
Stilwell
Road- the Road to Hope for North East India
Dr. Rakhee Bhattacharya, Fellow, Rajiv Gandhi Institute
for Contemporary Studies, New Delhi
The
objective of this paper is to think beyond security and
look for economic gains of North East Region through such
open route policy. NER has been a trouble –spot for
India due to historical reasons and due to the occurrence
of insurgencies, violent activities. Only recently it is
regarded as an important region and a ray of hope and optimism
of people can be visible. In states of Tripura and Assam
political leadership has been successful in transforming
into hopes of future from pains of past ushering into an
era of competence and expectation. Two leaders Mr Tarun
Gogoi and Mr. Manik Sarkar deserve a special applause for
their abilities to bring back rule of law through their
efforts and governance, development and counter insurgency
movement. Mizoram can also be included in the list where
militancy is a story of past. But ages of disconnect has
forced the region to remain far from limelight-connectivity
occupies the core area of concern. Disconnect has kept it
in isolation from mainland India and with the close neighbours
which share almost 98% of boundaries with NER. India made
a paradigm shift in its domestic and foreign policies way
back in 1991 with its economic liberalization and the strategic
shift from West to East by initiating LEP, which wishfully
thought of a) rebuilding the lost relations with the fast
growing SEA nations. b) revival of land locked and conflict
prone borderland of NER’s connectivity with SEA nations
with Myanmar as a gateway so that it can be conceptualized
as a trans-regional economic and cultural space to counter
this long standing issues of insurgency , human poverty
and economic backwardness.
Arunachal
Pradesh is the most isolated state in North East India which
awaits an opening and the historic route like Stilwell can
provide it with this opportunity. Debates and dialogues
are on the surface on the pros and cons of reopening of
the Stilwell Road and several efforts have been undertaken
as well in respect of both economic and security paradigms.
A fresh thought is now being given to this Road as potential
passage for socio economic development of the future generation
of this contiguous region. The border region of Patkai range
is still inhabited by a dozen of ethnic communities and
opening of this Road will help to connect themselves and
restore lost links ethnically, culturally across the border.
She personally interacted with the people from academia,
political figures, business sector and administrative circle
and common people. To them the reopening of Stilwell Road
is like a dream come true. All the Chief Ministers of the
NER have come to a consensus and requested the Prime Minister
to reopen the road. The central government should open the
Road to translate dream into actuality and to boost trade
and commerce. Among the 3 nations with which the Road runs
– China has already pursued the idea of reopening
and has repelled the idea of the constructive stretch of
the Road with 6 Link Express Highway. But on the contrary
Myanmar was extremely indecisive as it passes through its
jungle-covered mountainous and swampy valley of Kachin state-the
most insurgency prone area. India was also in an uncomfortable
position and there was a ray of hope as Myanmar agreed to
honour the long-standing need of the region by reopening
Stilwell Road to facilitate trade with India, China and
Myanmar. In Indian Chamber of Commerce 5th NE Business Summit
at Kolkata in January 2010 Myanmar Foreign Minister, Nyan
Win, gave the assurance of reopening the Stilwell Road.
He said that China has already constructed the Road upto
Ta Nai of Kachin district and there is a balanced portion
from Ta Nai to Indian border upto Ledo from Pangsu Pass
a stretch of 230 kilometers which can now be completed with
the support from the government of India. With this assurance
it was expected that the last obstacle was removed and there
should be restoration of trans-border linkages. But two
years have passed without any concrete result. It seems
that the MEA is not very still very keen on reopening it
for the same age old security reasons though Home Ministry
stated there should be trade across the borders. It is expected
that the reopening of the Road would be a win-win relation
in terms of trade and economic aspects.
For
the NER, Mr. Gogoi thinks that the Road makes it possible
to use Myanmar for channelizing its goods to ASEAN countries.
It will also make the distance between India and China shorter
from about 6000 kilometers to 750 kilometers as well as
it would cut 30% transport cost between India and China
thereby boosting Sino-India overland trade. Cargo reaching
to Yunan would be done in about 2 days in place of 2 weeks.
Most importantly the otherwise isolated state Arunachal
Pradesh would be connected to Myanmar. Arunachal Pradesh
therefore has submitted proposal to the Centre beginning
border trade with China, Myanmar from various locations.
Apart from trade it would also be used to tap the untapped
resources like horticulture, floriculture, tourism. It is
meant for reviving closed cultural, spiritual, ethnic ties
but the NER should not be used as dumping ground for Chinese
products. There should be very good intraregional understanding
for reopening of the Road through intra regional connectivity
and there should be appropriate law, rules, customs regulations
and security forces. State, market and civil society are
the 3 pillars of development and are expected to feel less
threatened by the vulnerability of insurgencies. Congenial
negotiations and understanding are required for making the
Road workable.
Implications
of Engaging Mynamar for India’s north east: Trade,
Transit and Security,
Dr. Gurudas Das, Faculty, National Institute of Technology,
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Silchar
India’s
Myanmar policy is often explained in strategic studies in
terms of reactions against Chinese penetration in Myanmar.
Myanmar is often seen as a contesting ground for the strategic
interests of China and India. This kind of formulation tries
to explain interstate behavior in terms of the interplay
of interests of the larger power, the tendency partly rooted
in political reality during the cold-war bipolarity. The
basic flaw in such analysis is that it overlooks the independent
nature of decision making by the nation state and the balance
of power politics played by the nation states in order to
secure their national interests is often underestimated.
Much of the strategic studies literature dealing with Indo-Myanmar
relations suffer from such limitations. India’s Myanmar
policy was labeled as “idealistic” till early
1990s (1992), and then shifted towards a “pragmatic”
one since mid-1990s. While the critics of realist school
often accuse that adoption of an “idealistic”
approach by India towards Myanmar in a way helped China
to ingress in Myanmar that has now posed a strategic security
challenge to India in general and her maritime security
in particular. Conversely, the critics of the liberal school
often accused Indian government for engaging the military
backed Myanmar regime who does not value democracy and human
rights.
However,
neither the realist approach nor the liberal approach can
adequately capture the interstate relationship in its entirety.
A state can fuse both the approaches while dealing with
its relation with other countries. There is no incongruity
when India awarded Jawaharlal Nehru Peace prize to Aung
Sang Suu Kyi and simultaneously engaged the military rulers
of Myanmar in order to protect national interest. In fact,
engagement should not be taken as a blank cheque of support
for whatever the activities undertaken by the partner country.
Praising the good efforts and extending support for their
actualization should go hand in hand condemning the bad.
Looking from this perspective, India’s Myanmar policy
is far more balanced compared to China’s Myanmar policy.
Why
is it that India’s engagement with Myanmar could cut
little ice compared to China? India’s goals in Myanmar
range from geo-economic interests to geo-strategic interest,
maritime security and security and development of NER. But
India’s engagement in Myanmar, as compared to that
of China’s, is not yet very significant. One of the
reasons for this poor success is perhaps due to the fact
that India’s strategy has not been adequately focused
on the north eastern region. Although NER is India’s
gateway to Myanmar, development interest of NER has not
been synchronized with India’s strategy for engaging
Myanmar.
The much cited incident of India losing to reap the benefit
of new found natural gas reserve in Shwe Project in Myanmar
to China is a case in pointer. Moreover, it may be noted
that in spite of tremendous increase in Indo-Myanmar two
way trade, the border trade between NER and Myanmar has
remained insignificant. While the share of NER-Myanmar border
trade through Moreh-Tamu sector was 1.53 per cent of the
total volume of Indo-Myanmar trade in 2006-07, it has sharply
declined to 0.15 per cent in 2009-10 (table 1). In fact
Indo-Myanmar trade almost entirely flows through sea route
rather than the land route that passes through NER. The
commodity composition of trade also reveals that both India’s
import and export baskets comprise of goods demanded and
produced in the mainland.
Thus trade through Moreh-Tamu sector is essentially remained
as transit trade without any organic link with the local
economy. Unlike NER-Bangladesh trade, the growth generating
potential of NER-Myanmar trade is extremely limited due
to very weak dyadic linkages between trade and local resources.
In contrast, perhaps this dyadic linkage--resource and trade--and
triadic linkages--resource, industry and trade--explains
the reasons for the success of China-Myanmar as well as
Thai-Myanmar border trade.
The development interest of India’s North Eastern
Region, needs to be put at the centre of India’s Myanmar
policy. The way economic interdependence has grown across
the Sino-Myanmar border, the same is visibly absent across
the Indo-Myanmar border. While China has successfully factored
her policy of South-Western Development into her Myanmar
policy, India needs to develop a similar strategy to infuse
economic growth into her North Eastern Region. While Yunan
and Sichuan can offer many cheap Chinese products to Myanmar,
neither Imphal, nor Kohima nor Guwahati has anything to
offer. As a result, while China can leverage from economics
of neighbourhood to address the problems of underdevelopment
of her South Western region, it is difficult for India to
have the same leverage due to very weak production structure
in all the bordering states of NER. Thus, India’s
Myanmar policy and development policy of NER should be conjoint
objectives which will enable India to use proximate geographical
area as the spearhead of our Myanmar Policy (Sen: 2011).
Out of the four goals of India’s Myanmar Policy that
we have enumerated, except maritime security other three
can be achieved if NER is put at the centre of the policy.
Moreh
to Myanmar: Look East and its Promising Engagements
Ms Sayantani Sen Mazumdar, Fellow, Global India Foundation,
Kolkata
The
paper aims to focus on the relevance of Moreh (Manipur)
of the North-East Region in India’s cooperative pursuits
with Myanmar. The paper, while analyzing the dynamic paradigms
of India’s Look East Policy that signify the development
of the North East as one of the most decisive prerequisites
for the success of the Policy, predominantly aims to underline
the significance of Moreh as a gateway to Myanmar, which
is in turn, is the land bridge to South-East Asia. In this
endeavour, the study will strive to assess the role and
potentialities of Moreh of Manipur in deepening India’s
engagements with Myanmar. The presentation, in this vein,
seeks to critically appraise the implications of political
instabilities of the Region for the prospect of trade facilitation
and economic cooperation between Moreh and Myanmar. Indian
interests in Myanmar are guided by certain considerations
like; containment of Chinese economic and strategic influences
in South East Asia in general and Myanmar in particular,
guiding Myanmar in exploring her vibrant gas fields and
thereby exploiting the energy resources, getting Myanmar’s
government to come down heavily on the North East’s
insurgents and rebel groups that have taken shelter and
been pursuing violent activities there, to obtain inter-modal
transit facility for the goods and services being traded
between India and South East Asian countries. There is a
good scope for investment in Moreh for creating infrastructure
facilities in the areas of road construction, power generation,
developed industrial areas, water facilities, IT services
etc in Manipur. Inspite of possessing so many potentialities
Manipur is still far behind from earning due recognition.
Border trade needs to be highlighted in view of the need
to forge closer commercial and economic links with the larger
markets in the fast developing South-East Asian economies.
The border trade between India and Myanmar has been operational
for more than a decade now. It is high time now to assess
the benefits accrued from the trade and also to study the
lacunae that might hinder the trade. Focus should be on
the assessment of trade relations, trade flow, regional
development and a framework to facilitate and strengthen
the cross-border economic integration should be suggested
between the North East Region and Myanmar. Thus cross-border
markets may act as vent for the surplus produced in NER
as well as source of cheaper imports. The production structure
of the border states needs to be reorganized in line with
the demand structure of the neighbouring country. As the
import basket of Myanmar mainly consists of manufactured
goods, NER could benefit from trade with Myanmar only if
it could industrialize itself. It is thus important to have
a market survey in Myanmar and identify the products which
NER can produce at competitive costs preferably using her
own resources. India needs to consider “border trade”
as a strategy for the development of the border areas. In
this light the role of political instabilities in Moreh
in impeding the prospect of trade was discussed in considerable
detail. The argument is that it is very difficult to comment
on the relative degree of prominence of political autonomy
and economic development in context of the NER. From her
personal experiences in Moreh in September, 2010, she enumerated
that the demand for political autonomy by two separatist
tribes Nagas and Kukis led to the paucity of economic activities
thereby leading to economic disaster in Imphal. North-East
Region is considered as a ‘backward Region’,
a Region, despite being the possessor of abundant resources
and potentials, has failed to develop to its maximum capacity
due to the frequency of insurgencies and violent activities.
India’s Look East Policy has given a significant dimension
to this Region and nowadays much is being talked about the
development of the Region. But the pace of economic development
suffers a severe jolt by distressing political activities-
a menace which is really incomprehensible. That might be
an important reason for the failure of the Policy to be
a manifestation of improved standard of living in NER. The
LEP is committed to develop the NER economically for which
it needs to settle political instabilities. The government
is proactively involved in the discussions with the insurgent
groups with the motive to reduce the intensity of violence
through lying down of arms and related violent tactics.
Unless this happens, LEP will fail to develop NER. LEP is
entrusted with the responsibility of merging economic development
and political stability. Since Myanmar served as the connecting
link between India and South East Asia, the success of Look
East Policy harps largely on India’s friendly and
cooperative links with its resource rich neighbour. India’s
policy of strengthening ties and deepening engagements with
Myanmar, thus, is governed by the crucial factors as boosting
bilateral economic ties, democratic government’s cooperation
in addressing the plaguing problem of insurgency in the
NER, and checkmating China’s overwhelming dominance
in Myanmar. It is an undeniable fact that exchange of visits
by executives and top ranking officials between the two
countries stimulated mutual understandings, facilitated
clearing of clouds of misunderstandings and misapprehensions
along with the identification of areas of cooperation and
of framing strategies for peace and prosperity of both the
countries. But there should be real target determination
for the purpose of achieving fruitful outcomes and in this
light the people of the North-East should involve themselves
enthusiastically in the cooperative endeavours with the
adequate backup from the state governments.
ASEAN-India
Connectivity Projects: Implications for India’s North-East
Dr. Prabir De, Fellow, Research and Information System for
Developing Countries
The
presentation largely focused on ASEAN as India’s major
trading partner. His data project that ASEAN is India’s
one of the largest trade partners with bilateral trade in
goods crossing US$ 50 billion in 2010. India’s trade
with ASEAN is likely to cross US$ 100 billion in 2013. India-ASEAN
Free Trade Agreement, took effect from January, 2010, is
likely to be converted into Comprehensive Economic Preferential
Agreement. The major challenge thwarting the booming of
Indo-ASEAN trade is the infrastructure and the connectivity
gap.
The
benefits accrued from better connectivity are immense in
nature. Better connectivity generates growth, attracts investment,
creates employment and reduces poverty. It infuses dynamism
in regional production network and reduces trade costs to
a great extent. His presentation enumerates in detail a
master plan of ASEAN connectivity. At present Asian market
is fragmented and is often an obstacle to free flow of goods
and services and the administrative or technical barriers
in the market result in expensive mobility within Asia.
Asia’s aim of single market depends on the existence
of seamless, flexible and efficient logistics and transportation
system. In 2010, the East Asia Summit leaders adopted a
comprehensive strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive
growth. At the 17th ASEAN Summit in 2010, ASEAN leaders
adopted the Master Plan of ASEAN Connectivity which identifies
key strategies and actions to enhance the region’s
connectivity in primarily three dimensions- physical, institutional
and people to people. It shows the way ahead for Asia in
regional integration. East Asian integration is market driven,
facilitated by fragmentation of production. There are two
major windows-FTA (software) and Connectivity/Service Links
(hardware). Connectivity in India shows two structures-national
and regional. Regional connectivity with ASEAN has two axis
– NER and Southern region.
NER
comprising 4% of India’s population and 9% of India’s
geographical area presents 3% of India’s gross domestic
product. NER is services driven economy-59% of annual average
income coming from services sector. India has international
borders with Bangladesh (4097km) and Myanmar (1643 km).
NER is India’s gateway to South East Asia. Major impediments
to ASEAN-India trade are inadequate infrastructure, absence
of regional transit trade, mismatch of standards, unfavourable
currency in border trade, poor institution and governance.
Important regional connectivity projects involving NER are
Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, India-Myanmar-Thailand
Trilateral Highway, Delhi-Hanoi Railway Link, Mekong-India
Economic Corridor.
The major challenges in this aspect are funding of regional
infrastructure projects, stronger institutions for regional
cooperation, supporting skill, stronger coordination, land
acquisition, environment. His concluding remarks are- trade
between India and East Asia is the major development, India-ASEAN
connectivity holds the key to deeper Asian integration,
an integrated action plan for achieving a common market
by 2020 is required, NER states are likely to gain more
from connectivity projects, political peace and security
are mandatory for trading across border, economic corridors
should connect border areas, rural economy, agriculture
sector and thrust should be on capacity building, development
cooperation.
Substantial discussions followed the end of the second session.
The issue of security incumbent upon the prospect of the
opening up of the Stilwell Road and the products which Arunachal
Pradesh sell and export to Myanmar through this Road, air
connectivity, and the production of orchids and bamboos
were deliberated upon. It was agreed by all present that
relations with Myanmar will always be of strategic significance.
We should not underestimate Myanmar’s own interest
and choices. In response to a question as to whether China
is going to overwhelm Myanmar, the then Indian Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru had stated that Myanmar has its strong
notion of a nation. It was also accepted that the role of
NER is important in both strategic and economic matters.
Lack of adequate demand in NER, local demands should be
accounted for. Development is really very slow and compared
to China’s proactive initiatives, India should delve
more deeply into the pressing issues.
The
3rd session was premised on Political and Economic
Partnership between India and Myanmar. This session
was chaired by Prof. Samir Kr. Das and the speakers were
Dr. Pavin, Dr. Amita Batra and Dr. C.J. Thomas.
India
Myanmar: Evolving Economic Relationship
Dr. Amita Batra, Faculty, South Asian Study, Jawaharlal
Nehru University, New Delhi
The
literature that focuses on economic integration between
India and East Asia or South East Asia makes very little
mention of Myanmar. Huge potential lies in terms of connecting
India with Myanmar and the NER has immense possibilities
to reap benefits out of it. When LEP was launched in 1992
how much momentum was being given to NER is undoubtedly
questionable but so far as economic dynamism is concerned
it has almost bypassed NER. India’s process of liberalization,
developed export oriented outward looking strategy towards
SEA neighbours was a more relevant aim with which LEP was
formulated. Geographical proximity focuses on important
landline and maritime boundary, shortest land and sea access
to SEA. In economic perspective what China appears to be
doing in an economic garb as strategic policy appears to
have led India to its catch up mode in foreign policy and
associating itself with Myanmar is one of the foremost orientations
of its external policies. From economic perspective the
ongoing proximities between the 2 countries in pure economic
terms are being looked as bases of potentials to trade with
each other. Natural trading partners have high proximities
to trade with each other especially when religious, cultural,
ethnic similarities prevail between them. Unfortunately
the trade figures show that the potentials have not been
realized to its optimum level. Policies of both the countries
are to be blamed for being inward-looking, what is being
talked about in terms of increase in trade policies between
India and Myanmar is minimal compared to that of trade with
other bordering countries. In terms of development India-Myanmar
border trade is not up to the mark. So there should be focus
on real economics in addition to real politics.
Significant paradigms of India-Myanmar relations are the
years 1948-62, 1962-88, 1988-92, 1992 in context of the
LEP, ASEAN membership, the development of India’s
NER, Chinese growing engagement, real momentum 1998, high
level of official visits 2004, 2008 and 2011. There is immense
scope for cooperation between India and Myanmar to deal
in agro based products, floriculture, engineering, timber
and tobacco and expand business cooperation. India is one
of Myanmar’s major trading partners and one of the
largest markets for its goods. India-Myanmar bilateral trade
has grown more than 80 times in the last 25 years. But the
base has been small there is need to grow and expand further.
The trade figures from 1980-81, US$ 12.4 million became
995 million US dollar in 2007-2008. Trade would have been
larger had it not been through third country like Singapore.
India’s import in Myanmar in 1990-00 was US$ 215.35
million and in 2007-08 it was US$ 809.94 million. The balance
of trade is heavily in favour of Myanmar. India can provide
the technology to improve productivity in Myanmar’s
tea industry. India’s expertise in gem cutting and
polishing can be harnessed to provide a boost to the semiprecious
gems industry in Myanmar. Myanmar contributes to nearly
one-fifth of India’s imports of timber second only
to Malaysia as timber and wood products accounted for nearly
30% of Myanmar’s exports to India. Myanmar is the
second largest supplier of beans, pulses to India, next
only to Australia.
Border trades both legal and illegal trade take place. The
bilateral border trade agreement of 1994 provides framework
facilitates by which trade is carried out between India
and Myanmar. The central regions are better off in comparison
to border areas. Several factors like limited number of
commodities, existence of checkposts make the costs exorbitantly
high, excessive regulation and restriction make the matter
all the more difficult. Though regulation is needed in case
of banking facilities and in exchange of currency rates
but infrastructural development is highly required. Her
presentation also focused on the developmental projects
like Kaladan, Tamanthi, trans-Asian Highway. India and Myanmar
have immense potentials for cooperation in the field of
natural gas. Myanmar has reportedly one of the world’s
biggest gas reserves estimated to be more than 90 trillion
cubic feet. ONGC Videsh Limited and Gas Authority of India
Limited holds a 30% stake in the exploration and production
of gas in Myanmar’s offshore blocks located in the
Sittwe area of Arakan state. Alternative mode emphasizes
on SEZ to India-Bangladesh –Myanmar gas pipeline which
has gone to China. Important facets of Indo-Myanmar cooperation
are India-ASEAN FTA, East Asia Summit, BIMSTEC, MGC. She
gave a skeptical outlook about the achievement of BIMSTEC
since its inception in 1997. Potentials are there but what
we see is lot of rhetoric but imperatives as Chinese economic
engagement with Myanmar, future growth leaders as Asian
triangle-(China, ASEAN and India), geographical advantage
of Myanmar and internal development of both the countries
are equally significant. Reorientation and reformulation
of industrial sectors is important too.
Trade
and Cooperation across the border: Need for a bold and balanced
policy towards India-Myanmar Border Trade
Dr. C.J.Thomas, Acting Director, ICSSR- North-East Regional
Council, Shillong
The
presentation broadly focuses on the importance of Myanmar
to India, reasons for failure of border trade between India
and Myanmar, the way forward for better trade between India
and Myanmar, the role of local communities in Moreh-Tamu
sector and a policy prescription for a bold and balanced
policy towards Myanmar. Apart from other geographical reasons
the cardinal issues are both share the strategic water of
the Bay of Bengal and as a member of ASEAN Myanmar provides
India a geographical contiguity with a politically significant
and economically vibrant Asia-Pacific region.
The
border trade between Moreh and Tamu which reached its peak
in 1998 failed due to the following reasons-the problem
of insurgency in the state of Manipur-19 insurgent groups
in Moreh, poor infrastructure, sea route is preferred than
land, various pressure groups did not allow any trucks to
cross the highway to Moreh for nearly 4months during 2011
and frequent bandhs, insecurity among the trading and the
non non local community, no proper electricity supply in
the entire Moreh town area, poor telephone, internet, banking
system in Moreh, and that Tamu trade and commerce officials
are not trained in the trade transaction matter. There is
only one bank UBI that looks after the entire trade in Moreh.
The government should find ways and means for conversion
of current border trade into a normal trade between India-Myanmar.
Law and order must prevent bandh and blockade, there should
be licensed and bonded public or private ware house. Adequate
security is needed for the business community. Myanmarese
authorities must be persuaded to introduce a stable policy
acceptable to traders from both countries. There should
be a testing laboratory for importing food items. More focus
on infrastructure development, visa for travelling to Myanmar
by land route for business and tourist purposes, improvement
of banking facilities, need for SBI at Moreh, telecommunication
and electricity are required. Security personnel harassment
needs to be contained. There is also the need to reduce
number of check post along NH 39 from Dimapur-Moreh and
improve the Highway into four lanes. Huge revenue to the
state government is lost due to corruption and lack of governance.
The government of Manipur, particularly its commerce and
industries department should take an active interest in
developing the Moreh town area, post honest officials there
and reward such officials for their honesty.
Significant changes have taken place in Myanmar in the last
few years ushering reforms both politically and economically.
There have been unprecedented gestures of good will towards
democracy movement leader Aung Saw Suu Kyi, unexpected freedom
to debate in the Parliament-Pyihaungsu HluHaw (Union Assembly)
and Pyithu Hlu Haw (People’s Assembly), crackdown
on corruption, and moves to bring competiveness and transparency
to the opaque business sector. There is a need for change
in our mindset. India’s foreign policy to a large
extent is focused on China, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Srilanka.
Myanmar is ignored. It is important to engage seriously
with the government, opposition party leaders and NGOs there.
People to people contacts should be encouraged. Seminars
and Conferences on India-Myanmar should be organized in
the states bordering with Myanmar. Universities and colleges
should be encouraged to organize seminars and undertake
research projects related to that country, explore how the
Universities, schools and colleges in the NER can attract
students from Myanmar by showcasing the opportunities and
research facilities available with them. Academic exchange
programme as Indo-Myanmar, similar to the one as Indo-French
or India-China of ICSSR, New Delhi. Teaching of Myanmarese
language should be encouraged. Language schools should be
penetrated in both the regions. All the previous MOU s signed
between India and Myanmar must be implemented without further
delay. Investments should flow from big conglomerates like
Tata, Birla, Ambanis. Development of infrastructure is also
need. India’s “Myanmar policy” should
be an inseparable part of India’s NE policy. There
is also a need for a change from conflict resolution approach
to utilization of opportunities approach. We should ensure
that development does not pass by NER but passes through
NER. This was reiterated by Shashi Tharoor in BIMSTEC Seminar.
A comprehensive charter of cooperation for economic, technological,
educational, anti-terror operations is the urgent need of
the day. India should not try and match the influence of
China on Myanmar and instead it should focus on malnourished
children, rampant malaria and tuberculosis and the specter
of HIV/AIDS. India should extend its helping hand in these
sectors and win the hearts of the people of Myanmar which
will usher a new era of India-Myanmar relations. Myanmar
is exporting three deadly things to India-drugs, refugees
and diseases.
ASEAN’s Ambivalent Views
of India Myanmar Relations
Dr. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Fellow, Institute of South East
Asian Studies, Singapore
The
relation between India and Myanmar is the most controversial
and pragmatic one. The essence of this relationship is border
security (NER and West Myanmar), energy needs of India,
en route to SEA for India as well as balancing China. Since
Myanmar is opening up it also looks upon India to reduce
the Chinese impact on Myanmar. There would be more actors
who want to be involved in economic activities in Myanmar
and the Chinese influence is notably immense. Myanmar can
reach out to many powers and can diversify its policy actions
since it is opening up. India had been diplomatic and was
more oriented towards economic cooperation in its pursuits
with Myanmar.
In context of ASEAN, the benefits of Indo-Myanmar relations
are evident. Better ties between India and Myanmar create
peaceful environment, reduce Chinese influence a more balanced
power distribution in the region is desirable. Myanmar has
established its credibility as a gateway to India and ASEAN
in terms of connectivity and shared borders. It would also
compliment region’s community building efforts like
ASEAN +6 and the EAS. Community building would take place
in 2015 which would re -strength India’s LEP. But
the negative impact of the relations is that Myanmar has
turned to India thus reducing ASEAN’s influence on
Myanmar. There is a large scale of economic competition.
Oil and gas in Myanmar would be the major exports to India
and thus, Singapore would suffer most. It is thus a complex
game of geo-politics. ASEAN can lose its role of legitimacy
provider; it can no longer be in driver seat. There is also
the plausibility of fierce competition between China and
India. Peaceful border in NER might become manufacturing
hub.
India currently lags behind China, thus good relations with
Myanmar could help it to catch up with ASEAN. Good relations
with Myanmar encourage India to play a larger economic and
geopolitical role. India encouraging US in its policy shift
vis-à-vis Myanmar especially with Myanmar opening
up. Peaceful border zones would come up at expense of both.
India being the largest democracy can be an inspiration
for democratic forces in Myanmar. LEP must benefit India
but might be at the expense of the NER. India looks West
instead of looking East.
*****
At
the end of paper presentations, the Chair Prof. Samir Kumar
Das commented that India’s foreign policy is squinted.
Trade volume between India and ASEAN has increased exponentially
but at the expense of NER as the trade bypasses the North
East. The NER needs to look to its East and concentrate
on border trade which is currently suffering due to insecurities.
ASEAN has been supportive of Myanmar consistently and has
followed the policy of constructive engagement. Extra-regional
actors like the United States, Norway are making inroads
in Myanmar, providing additional challenge to regional actors
like China and India.
It was discussed during the question and answer session
that we should we scrutinize the conditions preventing Indian
businessmen to go to Myanmar. A cursory reading of LEP documents
issued from different sources of government of India suggest
that they think in terms of movement of services and commodities
rather than in terms of people as well as in the NER there
is expectation that once LEP comes into force, people will
meet their ethnic cousins across borders. So there is incompatibility
between official imagination on one hand and the popular
imagination on the other. Movement of goods and services
due to globalization would definitely come with a price
tag. The negative impact would be the upcoming challenges
we need to address to, (how to pay price) and the best way
out is better policing and on the humanitarian ground huge
assistance is required. The nature of market needs to be
studied thoroughly which will consolidate our growth and
our distributive performances.
India cannot afford to ignore this strategically important
eastern neighbour and has undertaken substantive endeavours
and projects in this connection. Strong political will and
determination are required by both the neighbours for implementing
initiatives. But the deliberations of the Conference highlighted
that Myanmar is resolutely determined to cling to Southeast
Asia and restrains itself to a somewhat neutral and equidistant
position between India and China. The Conference was brought
to a close with the vote of thanks being proposed by Ms.
Sayantani Sen, Academic Coordinator, Global India Foundation.